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Abstract
Between 1674 and 1681, John Finch (1626-1682) and Thomas Baines (1622-1681)
produced a substantial body of writing on statecraft, religion, and the Ottoman Empire,
while Finch was serving as the English ambassador to the Ottomans. This thesis, which
represents the first substantial scholarly engagement with Finch’s political thought,
reconstructs both his understanding of the Ottoman Empire, and his theory of
sovereignty. By synthesizing a skeptical epistemology, a robust defense of the royal
supremacy over the Church of England, and his understanding of Ottoman history and
politics, Finch developed a theory of sovereignty in which liberty and coercion were
equally useful and legitimate tools of governance. By placing his manuscripts in relation
to current historiography on early modern Orientalism and the emergence of imperial
ideology, this thesis offers a new interpretation of the relationship between scholarship
and empire in early modern England.
Keywords: Thomas Baines, ecclesiology, England, John Finch, Ottoman-Anglo
relations, Ottoman Empire, political philosophy, sovereignty, toleration.
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Abbreviations and Conventions
Abbreviations
BL

British Library

HMC Finch

Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of the
Late Allen George Finch (5 vols., 1913-2004)

EEBO

Early English Books Online

LRO

Record Office for Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland

ODNB

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

SP

State Papers

TNA

The National Archives of the UK

Conventions
Orthography. For the sake of clarity and accuracy, I have expanded most ligatures,
diagraphs, contractions, and abbreviations, while noting all such expansions. Thus, e.g.:
ye
yt
wch
governmt
Lodps:

[th]e
[tha]t
w[hi]ch
govern[en]t
Lo[r]d[shi]ps

I have retained some original forms, including the contracted ‘ed’ (as in “declard’”) and
the ampersand (‘&’). The original interchangeable i/j, u/v, ww/vv, and long s/s have been
regularized per current usage. In all other instances, I have retained the original grammar,
orthography, and capitalization.
Citations. The majority of the manuscript sources consulted are foliated; some, however,
were written as reports, or intended for publication, and therefore paginated by their
authors. Foliated manuscripts are cited as recto and verso (e.g., ‘76r-82v’), while
paginated manuscripts are cited by shelfmark, document number (where appropriate), and
page number. For uncalendared manuscripts, I have either cited the box number and the
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manuscript date, if available; or in some cases, the manuscript date and its citation in the
HMC Finch.
Dates.1 English ambassadors to the Ottoman empire typically used both the Julian and
Gregorian calendars until September 1752, when the Gregorian calendar was universally
adopted. According to the Julian calendar, the new year began on March 25. Thus, the
manuscripts cited regularly give the date in both styles during the period between January
1st and March 24th, when the two calendars differed: e.g. February 4/14, 1674/5,
indicating February 4, 1674 in the Julian year, and February 14, 1675 according to the
Gregorian calendar. I have retained the original dates for all manuscript sources.
Although documents prepared by English embassies occasionally listed the date
according to both the Islamic hijrī calendar (hicrī in Ottoman Turkish) and the CE
calendar, that does not appear to have been the convention during Finch’s tenure.
Because this research does not encompass Ottoman archival documents, my practice has
been to cite manuscript sources using only the CE calendar. However, when referring to
events from Islamic history, or to individual Ottoman subjects, I have given the dates as
CE/ hijrī (e.g., Mustafa II, r.1693-1703/981-1004). This has also been my practice when
referring to events between 1672-1681, when Finch lived in the Ottoman empire.
As a rough guide, the following table gives equivalences between the CE and hijrī
calendars, based on January 1 in the Gregorian calendar: 2
1660 CE
1670
1680
1690

1070 AH
1080
1090
1101

Conventions for dates and place names have been adapted from Michael Talbot’s British Ottoman
Relations, 1660-1807 (Boydell, 2017), xi-xii.
2
I have converted between CE and AH dates using the calculator provided by Islamic Philosophy Online,
using exact dates when possible, and otherwise based on January 1 in the Gregorian calendar (“Conversion
of Hijri A.H. (Islamic) and A.D. Christian (Gregorian) dates”,
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/hijri.htm).
1
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Terminology. Seventeenth-century European texts typically refer to locations in the
Ottoman empire using older Roman or Byzantine names. Ottoman place names are given
according to modern usage; hence, Istanbul instead of Constantinople, İzmir instead of
Smyrna, Edirne instead of Adrianople, etc. Except for Istanbul, I have also included the
archaic form, to reflect both modern usage and the archival sources; e.g., ‘Edirne
(Adrianople).’
When quoting directly from European manuscript sources, I have retained archaic or
polemic names for places and individuals. Where possible, I have attempted to identify
the place or individual in question, and have supplied the modern usage either in square
brackets, or in a footnote.3

3

The modern usage for Arabic and Turkish terms has been given per the IJMES Transliteration System for
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish (https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/TransChart.pdf).
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Introduction
I began to reflect Particularly upon the Greeke & Latin Historians; and I observd’
that under both those Empires The Generalls & Emperours carryd’ along with
them in their Warrs also Pens, (for few Emperours like Caesar were fitted to
write their own Commentary’s) that might deliver their Gesta and
achievem[en]ts with an advantageous varnish.4
John Finch, 1675-81
Napoleon considered Egypt a likely project precisely because he knew it
tactically, strategically, historically […] His plans for Egypt therefore became
the first in a long series of European encounters with the Orient in which the
Orientalist’s special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use […].5
Edward Said, Orientalism, 1979
John Finch (1626-1682) enjoyed a career that combined high-powered patronage with the
consistent disappointment of those patrons. Over the course of thirty-five years, he
corresponded fitfully with a number of notable philosophers, especially the Cambridge
Platonists Henry More and Anne Conway (who was, in fact, his half-sister); frustrated the
Royal Society’s ambitions for collaboration with their Italian counterpart; likely spied in
Italy for English foreign intelligence; briefly acted as a representative on the Council for
Plantations; wrote a philosophical treatise that was misattributed to his nephew until
1968; and served without great distinction as England’s ambassador to the Ottoman
empire between 1672-1681/1082-1091, until his recall under embarrassing
circumstances. It is little wonder that he has been almost entirely overlooked by
historians of philosophy, scholarship, and politics.
Nevertheless, Finch’s unpublished manuscripts offer an unexplored source of
evidence regarding the relationship between Orientalism, comparative religious thought,
and the nascence of English imperial ideology during the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. During the seventeenth century, the English reading public had
access to a rapidly growing corpus of literature about Muslim religious and political life;
as Noel Malcolm has noted, “any literate person” during the late sixteenth or the
seventeenth century “could gain access to a substantial body of information about the
4
5

LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 391.
Edward W Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 80.
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conditions of life and government in the Ottoman world.”6 Anders Ingram’s recent
exploitation of digital research methods helpfully confirms this insight: from a
statistically representative sample of 12,284 printed texts digitized through Early English
Books Online, over one quarter referenced the ‘Turks’, with immense spikes in the
normalized frequency of those references during the 1600s and the 1680s.7 To date,
however, historians have yet to place early modern Orientalists texts and authors in the
context of “the history of England’s fledgling empire.”8 Through a close reading and
analysis of John Finch’s unpublished manuscripts, I argue that he offers concrete
evidence that at least some early modern Orientalists sought to understand and to
replicate the success of the Ottoman empire: and that at least some early modern theorists
of European imperialism looked to Istanbul as a model.
In many ways, Finch’s methods and scholarly preoccupations were quintessentially
orientalist – he engaged in comparative scholarship, focused on a Muslim polity, in
relation to European imperialism. In this introduction, I begin by asking whether Finch’s
political philosophy can be understood as ‘orientalist,’ in the sense described by Edward
Said. While Said’s articulation of orientalism has become a familiar framework for
conceptualizing Anglo-Ottoman relations, I will ultimately argue that his thesis is
inadequate for understanding the nature of Finch’s orientation to empire. I then outline
the structure, argument, and methods employed by this thesis, before situating my
research with respect to the current literature on comparative religious scholarship,
Orientalism, and empire. By carefully reconstructing the current scholarly discourse, I
illustrate a significant gap – to date, scholars have not appreciated the relationship
between early modern Orientalism and the emergence of European imperialism. Finch’s
political philosophy, I argue, synthesizes epistemic skepticism and Orientalism with an

Noel Malcolm, “Positive Views of Islam and of Ottoman Rule in the Sixteenth Century: The Case of Jean
Bodin,” in The Renaissance and the Ottoman World, ed. Anna Contadini and Claire Norton (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2013), 197.
7
Anders Ingram, Writing the Ottomans: Turkish History in Early Modern England (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), 7–9.
8
William J Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and Its
Empire, 1648-1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9.
6
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orientation to empire; as a result, his thought is a first step in addressing this scholarly
oversight.

1.1 John Finch: An early modern orientalist?
Writing between 1675 and 1681, John Finch observed that in antiquity, both Greek and
Roman “Generalls & Emperours carryd’ along with them in their Warrs also Pens,” in
order to produce accurate and politically useful accounts of their conquests.9 For Finch,
the genre of historical writing was both epistemologically slippery, and uniquely suited to
the needs of ambitious politicians. In his view, history was written by the victor: unless
divinely inspired, a historian was liable to “commit to Paper Notorious Untruths. For in
all Matter of Controversy whether of [th]e Sword or the Pen the Prevayling Party
decipher the vanquishd’ under all the disadvantagious misreppresentations, that may give
credit to the Armes or Opinions of those who have depressd’ the adverse Party.”10
Elsewhere, he asserts that the early Christian Church and the Roman Empire were codependent upon one another, and assisted one another by upholding temporal and
spiritual control of conquered populations. “For as under the Temporall Empire of Rome,
everything was counted and call’d Barbarous that was not Subject to its Rule […] So
under the Spirituall Empire nothing was allow’d to be Christian, but what follow’d the
Practise of Rome.”11 According to Finch, the Roman Empire’s ability to define conquered
peoples justified those very conquests. Defining non-Romans as simultaneously
‘Barbarous’ in their civil manners and customs, and “Schismaticks or Hereticks” with
respect to the Roman Church, was a key component of the empire’s justification and
legitimation of conquest.
The interdependence that Finch posited between ecclesiastical history, scholarship,
and imperial self-interest is strikingly familiar to contemporary readers. Indeed, his
description of the relationship between ‘Warrs’ and ‘Pens’ instantly recalls Edward
Said’s argument that modern European scholars were deeply implicated in projects of
colonial expansion. For Said, Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt with parallel armies of
scholars and soldiers was archetypical of an orientalist colonial dynamic, wherein the
9

LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 391.
Ibid, 387-8.
11
Ibid, 77.
10
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expertise of European scholars was leveraged for the purposes of imperial conquest and
colonial government. In Napoleon’s case, historical, political, and anthropological
scholars were “enlist[ed]” to ensure the success of his military invasion, by creating a
paper Egypt which could be known “tactically, strategically, historically and – not to be
under-estimated – textually”.12
It might be tempting, therefore, to interpret John Finch’s writing about Islam as a
seventeenth-century prototype of the form of orientalism that Said described. If we were
to advance such an interpretation, we might suggest that Finch wrote at a historical
moment when English state actors were looking ahead to the formation of an English
empire. We might further suggest that he wrote about Islam and the Ottoman empire as a
contribution to a broader contemporary project of knowledge-production about Muslims;
and more specifically, that his scholarship should be understood as orientalist, in that it
sought to make the Ottoman polity both knowable and other, in order to facilitate and
justify English imperial goals.
Ultimately, I will make almost exactly the opposite argument.13 In my view, while
Finch’s Orientalism was clearly oriented towards imperialism, he sought to learn from the
Ottomans – not in order to dominate, subvert, or denigrate Muslims, but in order to
understand and adapt the Ottoman imperial model for an English context.

1.2 ‘Orientalism’ and contemporary Ottoman historiography
Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘orientalism’ to signify two related but distinct
concepts. Edward Said’s critique of orientalism in Western scholarship remains a
touchstone for any research in Anglo-Ottoman relations. When gesturing towards to his
thesis, or more generally, to the matrix of imperiousness and fascination with the
exoticised ‘other’ that characterized (and characterizes) so much of the cultural, political
and scholarly contact between Muslims and European Christians during the eighteenth
century onwards, I have referred to ‘orientalism’ or ‘orientalists.’

12

Said, Orientalism, 80–81.
Nabil Matar and Gerald MacLean have also argued that Said’s critique of modern European empires does
not adequately describe the relationship between early modern European writers and the Muslim polities;
see my discussion below, in sections 2.2 and 4.2.
13

4
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I also use the term in a second, less ideologically-freighted sense. The capitalized
term ‘Orientalism’ is used to refer to Europeans who used ethnographic, historical, or
philological methods to produce scholarship about the religions and cultures of North
Africa, East Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.14 While these concepts and usages
inevitably overlap, distinguishing between the two allows for a more precise discussion
of the multivalent relationships between scholarship and politics, in the context of the
history of empires and imperial ideology.
It is also important to clarify my relationship to the historiography of the Ottoman
empire, and of the early modern Islamic kingdoms more generally. The relationship
between contemporary Europeanists and Ottomanists can be fraught: as Kaya Şahin has
noted, while Ottomanists have made serious attempts at outreach, the reciprocation on the
part of Europeanists has been disappointing.15 Furthermore, when written by
Europeanists, studies of early modern British-Ottoman (and more broadly, ChristianIslamic) relations run a serious risk of what Suraiya Faroqhi has described as “the
Orientalist trap.”16 At best, they risk offering studies which are psychologically nuanced
in their portrayal of European Christians, but which portray Muslims as a monolith; at
worst, they can inadvertently re-iterate the binaries which Said critiqued as endemic to
French and Anglophone scholarship.
Early modernists have adopted several strategies to address or to mitigate this
conceptual pitfall. The contemporary scholarship on early modern British-Ottoman
relations dates to Nabil Matar’s ground-breaking Islam in Britain, 1558-1685
(Cambridge, 1998). Matar’s archival work was innovative and well-executed; however,
the field in general has tended to be strongly tilted towards literary and discourse studies.

Gerald MacLean has recently critiqued the impact of Said’s scholarship on later scholars’ ability to
critically distinguish between these two sense of ‘orientalism’ “Perhaps the most regrettable effect of Said’s
important study has been that many scholars coming of age in the long shadow of Orientalism have felt free
to dismiss the important historical studies produced by skilled and knowledgeable Orientalists, many of
whom do not reproduce the imperializing gestures discerned and described by Said, while even those who
can be so accused often have a great deal to teach us today” (Gerald MacLean, Looking East: English
Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800 [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007], 10).
15
Kaya Şahİn, “The Ottoman Empire in the Long Sixteenth Century,” Renaissance Quarterly 70, no. 1
(2017): 230.
16
Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 15–16.
14
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Much of the subsequent scholarship has sidestepped the ‘orientalist trap’ by focusing on
questions of dramatic representation, particularly the depictions of ‘the Turk’ and of
Muhammad in early modern theatre.17 Another strategy has been to put European and
Ottoman sources in relation to one another, as in Molly Greene’s excellent scholarship on
the “shared world” of the early modern Mediterranean.18 Finally, an increasingly common
strategy has been to focus on individuals, families, or groups who inhabited a transimperial or trans-cultural subjectivity.19
This thesis adopts a slightly different approach to the ‘orientalist trap.’ In my
analysis of Finch’s thought, I do not seek to understand how he represented Muslims, but
rather to reconstruct what he ‘thought he knew’ about Islam, Islamic history, and the
Ottoman Empire. This, I contend, is a minor but important adjustment, which allows us to
apply the tools of intellectual historians, rather than relying solely upon the methods of
discourse analysis. Finch, I argue, analyzed the Ottoman model for empire in relation to a
set of ecclesiological questions, which in turn translated his analysis into a language
which was comprehensible in the context of contemporary English politics. It exceeds my
scholarly competencies to analyze Ottoman sources as well, or to evaluate whether
Finch’s understanding of Ottoman history and politics was accurate. However, by
analyzing the ecclesiological framework for that understanding, we can illuminate how
his writing functioned in its own context.

1.3 Argument and structure
As I discuss in the literature review below, Said’s ground-breaking work on modern
orientalism and imperialism remains a dominant paradigm for understanding the
relationship between comparative religion, Islamic scholarship, and empire during the
17

Ingram, Writing the Ottomans, 9; and see e.g., Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, Britain and the Islamic
World, 1558-1713 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jonathan Burton, Traffic and Turning: Islam
and English Drama, 1579-1624 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005); MacLean, Looking East;
Matthew Dimmock, Mythologies of the Prophet Muhammad in Early Modern English Culture, 2013;
Matthew Dimmock, New Turkes: Dramatizing Islam and the Ottomans in Early Modern England, 2016.
18
Molly Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Molly Greene, Minorities in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, NJ:
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005).
19
See e.g., E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); John-Paul A Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows
in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull, 2014; Noel Malcolm, Agents of Empire:
Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World, 2016.
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nineteenth century. By contrast, early modernists have argued that his framework is
inadequate for explaining the political significance of seventeenth-century scholarship. In
the process, however, they have often simply denied the possibility of a connection
between early modern Orientalism and European imperialism.
As a result, the existing historiography has foreclosed a third possibility: that early
modern writers thought they might have something to learn from Muslims. Closing off
this possibility reflects the extent to which the presumed domination of Muslims by
Christian Europeans continues to structure contemporary thought: it is, in a sense,
unthinkable that early moderns might have, however grudgingly, sought political insight
through the study of the more powerful and vibrant Muslim kingdoms.
Our stubborn reluctance to identify links between early modern European
Orientalism and imperialism is compounded by a conceptual inability to understand how
these texts functioned in context. In the wake of J.G.A. Pocock’s seminal work, and the
broader impact of the Cambridge school of intellectual history, scholars have become
increasingly sensitive to the diversity of languages and discourses through which early
modern thinkers expressed political ideas. As Justin Champion notes, “we now have
accounts of the plural languages of political thinking in the period – jurisprudential,
common law, historical – but despite this pluralism of discourse the historiography had
almost entirely ignored the religious context.”20
In my view, the relationship between Orientalism and empire in Finch’s writing can
be excavated by understanding the theological framework in which he worked. Finch’s
political philosophy responds to a set of legal and political questions in Christian
ecclesiology: what is the correct legal status of Jews, Muslims, and Christian dissenters
within England? And, what is the correct relationship between the English crown and the
established Church? Both of these questions are ecclesiological in nature: they pertain to

Justin Champion, “Some Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and Religious
Freedom in Early Modern England,” in Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World: Early Modern and
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Elaine Glaser, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 50.
20
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the theology of the structure and governance of the church, and its relationship to the
state, and more broadly, to what we might call questions of ‘church and state.’21
Without arguing that ecclesiological writing itself should be considered a unique
‘language of political thought,’ Finch’s use of an ecclesiological lens frames his
understanding of the Ottoman Empire in a way that was politically meaningful in the
context of contemporary English politics. As I ultimately argue, Finch synthesizes
Ottoman history and politics, a skeptical epistemology, and a staunchly royalist
ecclesiology into a coherent ‘blueprint’ for empire. The first chapter offers an overview
and analysis of Finch’s biography, focusing briefly on his personal life, before turning to
an account of his embassy and his relationship with Thomas Baines. Unfortunately, little
is known about Baines outside of his relationship with Finch; however, his surviving
papers have been archived with Finch’s, and are extremely useful for clarifying Finch’s
thought. Throughout this chapter, I also critique the existing historiography on Finch,
which is in many ways hopelessly outdated.
In the second chapter, I reconstruct and analyze Finch’s political thought, with an
emphasis on his articulation of religious toleration. Finch developed two parallel
justifications for the liberty of individual conscience. Drawing from his understanding of
the early history of Islam, and the history of the early Christian church, Finch argued that
religious toleration was a normative principle of imperial statecraft. At the same time, as
an extension of his skepticism regarding the possibility of absolute knowledge, he
characterized the liberty of conscience as a ‘Humane Right.’ However, Finch
simultaneously privileged the unified, and unitary, sovereignty of the monarch. By

21

In the post-Reformation Reformed traditions, ecclesiological controversies and scholarship focused on a
broad range of theological questions: defining the church, identifying the true visible church, the nature of
church authority, the proper structure and authority of the ministry, and church government (see Ian
Hazlett, “Church and Church/State Relations in the Post-Reformation Reformed Tradition,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Early Modern Theology, 1600-1800, ed. Ulrich Lehner, Richard Muller, and A.G. Roeber
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016]). In this thesis, I use the term “ecclesiology” to refer to a
particular subset of these questions, relating to specifically to church government. In the early modern
English context, the sharpest cleavages over church government were between episcopal apologists, who
prominently included John Jewel and Richard Hooker, and presbyterians such as Andrew Melville, who
advocated for a non-hierarchical ministry and decentralized church government. My understanding of early
modern ecclesiology has been deeply shaped by the scholarship of Jacqueline Rose, in particular, who has
argued that ecclesiological debate in early modern England was inextricable from political factionalism,
and that political debate was often framed and informed by ecclesiological discourse.
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precisely defining both the ‘liberty of conscience’ and the church itself, Finch ultimately
synthesized a theory of imperial sovereignty in which liberty and coercion – toleration
and oppression – were equally legitimate tools of governance.
Finally, the conclusion builds upon my analysis of Finch’s political thought, and
places him in the context of imperial ideology. Finch’s manuscripts offer archival
evidence that at least some early modern Orientalists were motivated by an orientation
towards empire; concomitantly, at least some early modern theorists of empire looked to
Muslim models at the nascence of English imperialism.

1.4 Sources and Methodology
In order to reconstruct Finch’s political philosophy, I have relied upon a number of
manuscript sources written during his residence in Istanbul, between 1674 and 1681.
Finch and Baines produced a substantial body of writing about statecraft and government;
while it is impossible to know how much has been lost, the surviving materials include
three important letters to Edward Conway, a companion letter to Anne Conway, and
extensive sections from an unpublished philosophical treatise.22 The first manuscript is a
report by Finch written to Edward Conway, dated February 4/14, 1674/5, and sent from
‘Pera of Constantinople’ (see Appendix C for a complete transcription).23 In this
substantial report, Finch offers an historical and sociological explanation for the
tremendous success and stability of the Ottoman empire.24 The second manuscript is a
letter written by Finch to Anne Conway, dated February 8/18, 1674/5, and is an
abbreviated version of the earlier letter to her husband.
Thomas Baines also corresponded with Edward Conway, and on two occasions, sent
lengthy discourses on politics and statecraft. The first is roughly the same length as
Finch’s 1674/5 report, and is dated June 20/30, 1676; the second is dated May 11/21,
1681, and is likely Baines’ last correspondence before his death later that year. As I
discuss below, in section 2.3, the two men saw themselves as intellectually inextricable,
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and both of these letters contribute substantially to my reading of Finch’s intellectual
project.
The last manuscript is an extraordinarily long philosophical treatise in Finch’s hand,
including 544 quarto pages, and an additional 38-page précis (see Appendix B for a table
of contents). The treatise appears to be the final draft of a work which Finch may have
intended for publication, and which was drafted between 1675 and his return to England
in 1681.25 I have also drawn upon Finch’s uncalendared notes for this manuscript.26

1.5 Religious scholarship and empire: Reviewing the literature
To date, modern and early modern historians have differed sharply in their approach to
the relationship between comparative religion, Orientalism, and imperialism. Amongst
modern historians who focus on the history of scholarship during the nineteenth century,
it is almost axiomatic that Orientalists and comparative religious scholars were in
lockstep with European empires and imperial ideology.
By contrast, while early modern historians have produced detailed studies of both
Orientalism and comparative religion during their era – the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, especially – they have either denied or simply avoided discussing a relationship
to the history of European empires. Because this thesis posits exactly such a relationship,
the following literature review illustrates the existence of this gap in some detail.
1.5.1 Comparative religious scholarship and modern European empires
Within the last decade, a wealth of historical literature has investigated the relationships
between scholarship and European imperialism, colonialism, and intellectual
universalism. Indeed, it has become almost a commonplace that empiricism and
imperialism are closely related in European intellectual history. In many cases, scholars
have argued, new scholarly disciplines like demography, anthropology, and comparative
religious studies did not simply play a role in justifying and facilitating overseas empires;
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rather, their emergence in the mid- to late-nineteenth century was at least partially a
consequence of the knowledge-gathering requirements of European empires.27
Within this broad river of scholarship, the stream which is most relevant to this
project evaluates the disciplinary history of comparative religious studies and Islamic
studies in the nineteenth-century European academy. Tomoko Masuzawa and David
Chidester have written two of the most important historical monographs about the
disciplinary history of comparative religion. Their scholarship suggests that comparative
religious thought, which emerged in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, is deeply
embedded in European imperialism – both intellectual imperialism, as Masuzawa
discusses, and the administration of overseas empires, as Chidester argues.
The subtitle of Tomoko Masuzawa’s 2005 The Invention of World Religions – Or,
How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism – gestures
towards her broad historical argument. Until the early nineteenth-century (and as late as
1860, in some isolated examples), European scholars worked within a conceptual
paradigm that divided the “religions and nations” of the world into “four categories rather
unequal in size, value, and stature. There were Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and the
rest.”28 The ‘rest,’ whether termed ‘heathens’ or ‘pagans,’ were those who were either
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ignorant of or resistant to Christianity, “spiritual rustics, as yet untouched by the
civilizing knowledge of Christianity.”29 Jews and Muslims (or ‘Mohammedans,’ as early
moderns patronizingly phrased it) “did possess religion, but obviously they did not have
it quite right” – either they rejected Christ as the Messiah, “or worse, they chose to follow
a false prophet.”30
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, this once-hegemonic taxonomy had
been utterly replaced by the discourse of ‘world religions,’ a consistent list of ten or a
dozen designated “major religions, that is, those conspicuous-enough religions distinctly
and properly identified as now existing in the world.”31 Linguistically, the early modern
quadripartite division between Christians, Jews, Muslims, and ‘other’ was rapid and
complete. In a chapter titled “The Birth Trauma of World Religions,” Masuzawa offers a
masterful forensic reconstruction of the appearance of Wereldgodsdiensten and
Weltreligionen in Dutch and German scholarly vocabulary in the 1870s; the translation of
these new terms into the English ‘world religions,’ notably in Cornelius Tiele’s 1885
“Religions” entry in the 9th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica; and the remarkably
swift naturalization of that translated term in Anglophone, especially American,
scholarship.32
Importantly, however, this rapid shift in academic vocabulary disguises and reiterates
the ongoing subordination of non-Europeans and non-Christians to a Eurocentric
worldview. During the late-nineteenth century, European Arabists like Abraham Keunen
(1828-1891) and Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908) helped to crystalize a “concept of Islam as
the epitome of stifling rigidity, intolerance, and fanaticism.”33 In Masuzawa’s view, the
remarkable durability of this flagrantly counter-factual discourse represents the
nineteenth-century fulfillment of an early modern political necessity. As she observes –
and as we will note many more times by the end of this thesis – early modern European
Christians had few reasons to consider themselves superior to the Muslim worlds of the
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Mediterranean, and very good reasons to feel insecure in their engagements with Islam. 34
Masuzawa suggests that “the conquest of Islam in this complicated sense, then was the
utmost exigency for European modernity at the moment of its inception.”35 In short,
reifying ‘Islam’ within the discourse of ‘world religions’ both neutralizes early modern
Christian Europe’s greatest threat, and replicates the prejudices of the early modern
quadripartite paradigm within contemporary discourse.
Masuzawa’s scholarship is a cornerstone contribution to the history of comparative
religion, and its implication in the broader nineteenth-century project of European
universalism. Our focus narrows with David Chidester’s more recent Empire of Religion:
Imperialism and Comparative Religion (Chicago, 2014), which locates “the rise of an
academic study of religion” in Great Britain “within the power relations of imperial
ambitions, colonial situations, and indigenous innovations.”36
Chidester’s study focuses on the complex matrix of “mediations – imperial, colonial,
and indigenous” through which local scholars in South Africa, and scholars at the centre
of the British empire, collaborated in the production of a corpus of knowledge about
South African indigenous religions, particularly Zulu religion, between the 1870s and the
1920s.37 His major contribution is to precisely describe the process of scholarly
information flows between the imperial centre and the periphery. Chidester posits that the
representation of South African religion was subject to a “triple mediation”: an
indigenous mediation between missionary Christianity and ancestral traditions; a colonial
mediation on the part of local experts between conditions in the South African colony and
the demands of the imperial centre; and an imperial mediation which assimilated both the
indigenous and colonial mediations to an imperial time frame, which encompassed both
an imaginary “primitive” past and a “civilized” future.38 Religious categories emerged out
of complex reciprocal intellectual encounters between local and outside intellectuals.
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They “were not simply discovered by outside observers,” but “emerged through complex
interrelations, negotiations, and mediations between alien and indigenous intellectuals.”39
For Chidester, the emergence of comparative religious studies and the late British
Empire are inextricable from one another. On the one hand, he characterizes imperialism
as the midwife of the new scholarly discipline. British scholars were self-conscious of
their role in a scholarly arms race with imperial competitors in the Netherlands and
Germany. In 1902, the imperial theorist Edwin Hartland (1848-1927) warned that
Britain’s “much-vaunted […] genius for government and colonization will not save us” if
the empire did not more aggressively invest in religious and anthropological research.40
Although the British government ultimately ignored calls to formally support a
commission for the study of African religion, British scholarly networks picked up the
slack; “by the beginning of the twentieth century, the British had assembled an extensive
archive on savage beliefs, practices, and customs all over the world.”41
The crown jewel of this ‘empire of religion’ was the fifty-volume The Sacred Books
of the East, published between 1879-1910. This monumental archive was edited by the
philologist Max Müller, regarded as the progenitor of modern comparative religious
studies. During February and March 1870, Müller delivered a series of lectures to the
Royal Institution of Great Britain, which both Chidester and Masuzawa consider the birth
moment of comparative religion.42 Müller strongly foregrounded the interests of the
British empire at this formative moment, famously saying “let us take the old saying,
Divide et impera, and translate it somewhat freely by ‘Classify and conquer.’”43
In short, according to Chidester, imperial interests were inextricable from
comparative religion, at its earliest moments. On the other hand, he views comparative
religion as equally inextricable from the British Empire itself. Religious studies, he
claims, was the quintessential imperial discipline. “More than any other imperial science,
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comparative religion dealt with the essential identities and differences entailed in the
imperial encounter with the exotic East and savage Africa.”44
While clearly indebted to Masuzawa’s earlier analysis, Chidester’s argument differs
in two important ways. Whereas Masuzawa focuses on the irruption of comparative
religion in the European and American centres of empire, Chidester examines the
discipline’s relationship to empire as a reciprocal enterprise between the metropolitan
centre and the colonial periphery. More importantly, their projects characterize the
precise relationship between comparative religion and modern European imperialism
quite differently. For Chidester, the nexus is the scholarly production of an archive of
knowledge that closely served the interests of empire. Although much more historically
nuanced than Said, the broad strokes of this argument are profoundly similar to the
orientalism thesis. Masuzawa, by contrast, foregrounds nineteenth-century Islamic
scholarship as the connective tissue between comparative religion and empire. As we
have discussed, she views the congealing of an ossified, ahistorical, and intolerant
representation of Islam as European scholars’ key contribution to modern empire. The
Islamic polities in North African and the Ottoman empire, she argues, were the
ideological and military threat to early modern Christian Europe. ‘Defanging’ and
delegitimizing Islam was “the utmost exigency for European modernity at the moment of
its inception,” an act of nineteenth-century intellectual violence that fulfilled a centuriesold imperial need and enabled subsequent European domination of the Muslim world.45
1.5.2 Nineteenth-century Orientalism and European imperialism
Masuzawa and Chidester are key scholars for broadly understanding the relationships
between nineteenth-century religious scholarship and European universalism and
imperialism. Taken together, they suggest that comparative religion emerged in the midto late-nineteenth century academy, and that this new discipline played a key role in the
intellectual underpinnings of modern European imperialism, through the creation of
imperial archives, and the intellectual delegitimization of Islam. Within this framework,
scholars have also written more narrowly about nineteenth-century Orientalist
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scholarship, and its relationship to European imperialism. This literature is a vital
contribution to the broader study of comparative religion and empire, especially
considering that, by the 1920s, over half of the world’s Muslim population lived within
the jurisdiction of the British empire alone.46 Unsurprisingly, then, scholars have
investigated the role played by Islamic scholarship in not only the British, but also the
German and French imperial contexts.
In German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship
(Cambridge, 2009), Suzanne Marchand investigates the often-vexed relationships
between practitioners of Orientalistik – philologists, scholars of modern languages, and
comparative religious scholars – and German political actors between the 1820s and
1918. Chapter 8 is especially relevant to this project: titled “Orientalism in the Age of
Imperialism,” it focuses on the period between 1884 and 1914, when modern Germany
possessed an overseas empire in Africa, with some smaller possessions in southeast
Asia.47
During the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, German Orientalists were
substantially more interested in the “ancient pagan cultures of India, China, Egypt, and
Persia” than in their contemporary descendants.48 The contemporary Islamic world, in
particular, was largely ignored, being too ‘new’ for an academic culture oriented towards
ancient philology and critical Biblical scholarship. Furthermore, German academics
strongly disapproved of the missionaries and diplomats who attempted to contribute to
Orientalist scholarship during the early nineteenth century, considering them
insufficiently competent to do serious research.49 Although these attitudes did begin to
change as Bismarck’s unified Germany “joined the colonizing powers,” German
academics remained consistently more interested in "antiquity and 'pure' languages," to
Francis Robinson, “The British Empire and the Muslim World,” in The Oxford History of the British
Empire, ed. Judith Brown and William Louis, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 399. See p.
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the detriment of modern Arabic or Islamic study. The most important modern Arabist,
Martin Hartmann, "raged" that "even when modern authors did touch on the modern
history of the Islamic states, […] they did not take the subject very seriously."50
One of Marchand’s central arguments is that, while German academics were at the
cutting-edge of Orientalist scholarship between the 1870s and 1914, their research was an
awkward fit with the demands of imperialism. At an institutional level, both the German
state and academy were slow to invest in contemporary, politically ‘relevant’ Orientalist
scholarship, to their mutual frustration. It was not until 1885 that the University of Berlin
founded the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen, which existed primarily to train young
officials in the modern languages needed for trade, diplomacy, and colonial
administration in Africa and southeast Asia.51 And although nineteenth-century German
Orientalists were often very interested in, and sympathetic to colonialism – younger
scholars, in particular, were “tempted by the siren song of ‘relevance’” – their discipline
was rarely very useful to German colonialists.52 German Orientalistik was rooted in
biblical exegesis, the study of ancient civilizations, and ancient philology: “even if
everyone had been on the same political page […] it was hard to turn this ship around
quickly and to root out older values and traditional scholarly pursuits for the sake of
being ‘useful.’”53
Historiographically, this line of argument places Marchand in a productive tension
with Said’s critique of orientalism. Although German orientalists were not, in her view,
central to an imperial project, they were undoubtedly politically aligned with colonial
policy. Ultimately, they “were most useful in the implementation of ‘indirect’
colonialism, the practice of working with and through local customs, institutions, and
officials rather than seeking wholesale and immediate Europeanization.”54 However, she
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also argues that German Orientalists were far from univocally supportive of empire, and
that their disciplinary commitments led them to be far less concerned with the modern
questions of controlling local populations, than with “traditional, almost primeval
Christian questions” that would be instantly recognizable to an early modern humanist.55
For Marchand, “Said was engaging in a deliberate sort of deck-stacking [by] focusing
exclusively on British and French literature and scholarship produced during the high
imperial age.”56 Their German Orientalist counterparts were much less straight-forwardly
imperial.
In light of Marchand’s critique, it should perhaps be unsurprising that George
Trumbull IV’s An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in
Algeria, 1870-1914 maps much more comfortably onto the Saidian thesis.
Methodologically, Trumbull’s argument differs from the studies previously considered.
Rather than focus on a particular scholarly discipline, he argues that the scholarly genre
of ethnography emerged in direct response to the epistemological requirements of French
imperialism. During the French Third Republic, ethnographic writing, “drawn from
participant observation and research in vernacular languages,” particularly Arabic,
“articulated with an eye towards the maintenance of power represented the fundamental
means through which agents of French colonialism […] came to terms with Algeria and
with Algerian Islam.”57
Trumbull’s archival research is impeccable, but it must be said that this is a familiar
line of argument. The relationship he posits between Islamic scholarship, the colonial
archive, and imperial power closely follows from the insights of Said and Foucault. This
exposes him to Marchand’s sobering critique of cultural historians of imperialism, who
often fall into a “presumptuous and rather condescending […] conception […] that all
knowledge is power, especially since the prevailing way of understanding this
formulation suggests that power is something sinister and oppressive.”58
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In my view, however, Trumbull avoids theoretical over-determination through his
focus on the genre of ethnographic writing. This focus on an academic genre, rather than
a discipline, leads Trumbull to posit a rather different relationship between individual
scholars and colonialism than Marchand. Whereas German practitioners of Orientalistik
guarded their academic turf against missionaries and diplomats, French ethnographers in
Algeria were often colonial administrators themselves. For example, the most
comprehensive ethnographic study of Algerian Ṣūfism, Marabouts et Khouan: étude sur
l’Islam en Algerie, was written in 1884 by the chief of the Native Affairs service, Louis
Rinn, who later became the colonial Conseiller d’état. In his own words, Rinn’s intended
audience was “all the French agents who, with whatever title, in Algeria or abroad, have
the delicate and difficult mission of monitoring the religious or political machinations of
Muslims.”59
As a means of knowledge production, ethnography ably met the French imperial
need to “organize knowledge” – and by extension, colonized people – “into discrete,
utilitarian facts.”60 In the process of policing religious difference, French ethnographers
also superimposed cultural narratives onto their textual accounts of Algeria. One of the
most striking examples is their profound unease with Ṣūfism, which the French viewed as
politically subversive, and the resulting effort to govern Muslim religious practice
through scholarship and administration. Trumbull argues that, since the French revolution
in 1789, “French republicans had posited Catholic orders as a fundamental threat to
secular government, and it required only the easiest of transpositions to extend the image
to Ṣūfi orders, as well.”61 By equating the Ṣūfi ṭuruq with Catholic religious orders,
French ethnographers not only reframed the Islamic threat to imperial order through their
own historical lens, but also stimulated French paranoia about the political implications
of Ṣūfism.
Trumbull has also contributed a chapter to one of the most important recent volumes
on European empires and Islam. Edited by David Motadel, Islam and the European
Empires (Oxford, 2014), the collection is an attempt to consolidate and re-direct the
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scholarship on nineteenth century empires and Islam. In an introductory review essay,
Motadel suggests a new analytical framework for Orientalist scholarship and imperialism,
with chapters subdivided by their foci on ‘Islam and Imperial Rule,’ ‘Islam and AntiColonial Resistance,’ and ‘Islam and Colonial Knowledge.’62
Edward Said casts a long shadow over this last section, which includes papers on the
relationships between scholarship and power in the German, French, British, and
Japanese empires. As Motadel observes in his introduction, Foucauldian and Saidian
ideas have influenced “much, though not all, historical scholarship on the connections
between knowledge and colonial power.”63
The chapters which follow evidence a variety of stances towards this disciplinary
legacy. As in his earlier monograph, George Trumbull’s chapter on “French Colonial
Knowledge of Maraboutism” is clearly indebted to postmodern analyses of power and
knowledge, arguing that “the Algerian colonial bureaucracy institutionalized the
production of knowledge about marabouts” for both scholarly and administrative
purposes.64 In chapters on Islamic scholarship in the German and Japanese empires,
Rebekka Habermas and Cemil Aydin continue to complicate our view of the Saidian
thesis.65 Japanese scholarship, for instance, occupied a complex and ambivalent position
relative to Orientalist thought; although Japanese scholars were deeply interested in panIslamic thought, and the possibility of finding common cause with Muslims resisting
European empires, their writing was fundamentally indebted to a Eurocentric division
between Orient and Occident.66 By contrast, Faisal Devji’s contribution, “Islam and
British Imperial Thought,” energetically confronts Said by arguing that “Orientalism
operated in a thoroughly ambiguous and even contradictory way as far as modern or
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colonial forms of domination are concerned.”67 British imperial thinkers never offered
“’good’ and ‘bad’ versions of Orientalism,” he argues, and included a long-standing
effort to legitimate Britain’s empire in terms of Islamic political norms.68
Without claiming to be comprehensive, the preceding discussion is a firm foundation
for three conclusions about the recent literature on scholarship and modern imperialism.
First, comparative religion emerged as a modern academic discipline during the
nineteenth century, and was profoundly implicated in European projects of intellectual
universalism and political imperialism from the moment of its conception. Second,
nineteenth-century Orientalist scholarship operated either as a subset or a close relative of
comparative religious scholarship, and to various degrees, was invested in European
imperialism. British Orientalists saw their field as a critical edge over competing
European powers: French Orientalists took their cues directly from the epistemological
and material needs of empire, and were often colonial administrators themselves: and
while German Orientalists were often ambivalent towards colonial functionaries, and
were not directly ‘useful’ to German colonization, they nevertheless contributed
indirectly to the German Empire, and saw themselves in competition with their French,
British, and Dutch scholarly peers. Finally, while Said’s orientalism thesis imperfectly
accounts for the history of German scholarship, and is variously adapted or rejected by
contemporary historians, it remains a remarkably durable hermeneutic for understanding
the entanglements of nineteenth-century comparative religion, Orientalism, and modern
European empires.
1.5.3 Comparative religion in early modernity
When we turn to the literature on seventeenth-century Orientalist scholarship, a very
different picture emerges. Historians have written extensively, if sporadically, about both
comparative religious thought and Orientalist scholarship during the early modern period.
Unlike historians of nineteenth-century scholarship, however, early modern intellectual
historians have not explicitly asked whether or how this scholarship relates to the history
of empire during the seventeenth century. In the overview which follows, I first discuss
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the scholarly literature on comparative religious thought and Orientalism during the
seventeenth century, in order to illuminate this gap.
Over the last thirty-five years, two generations of early modern historians have
argued that comparative religious thought has its origins in the seventeenth century, not
the nineteenth. Clearly, this literature clashes with the scholarship we have previously
reviewed: in fact, what I have not acknowledged until now is that the birthdate of
comparative religion is a matter of significant scholarly controversy (by the genteel
standards of intellectual history). As Peter Harrison put it in 1990, “most accounts of the
history of comparative religion or of Religionswissenschaft have the ‘dispassionate’ study
of the religions beginning in the nineteenth century […] Yet for a number of reasons the
science of religion had to begin earlier.”69 Resolving this debate would substantially
exceed the scope of this thesis; accordingly, I will confine myself to establishing that
there is, in fact, a robust literature dealing with seventeenth-century comparative religion,
and to outlining some of the broad features of that literature. 70
The first generation of this scholarship is firmly rooted in Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s
classic study, The Meaning and End of Religion (1st ed. Harper Collins, 1962). Although
frequently cited as a canonical text, Smith arguably went much further than any
subsequent scholar by claiming that the idea of ‘religion’ was unhelpful as an explanatory
category, and should be replaced by a new framework of “personal faith” and
“cumulative tradition.”71 According to Smith, "rather than addressing ourselves to the
problem ‘What is the nature of religion?’, I suggest that an understanding of the
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variegated and evolving religious situation of mankind can proceed, and indeed perhaps
can proceed only, if that question in that form be set aside or dropped, as inapt.”72
Although, according to Smith, the intellectual category of ‘the religions’ would not
emerge in its modern form until the mid-nineteenth century, its roots lie in early
modernity. Etymologically, the term ‘religion’ derives from the Latin religio, which for
Lucretius and Cicero referred narrowly to the external, public rites offered to the gods. 73
Originally, the term did not encompass ‘faith’, inward belief, or a sense of the nonintellectual or irrational, all constituent components of the modern category of
‘religion.’74 Even the early Christian Church, he argues, did not understand itself in terms
of ‘religion.’ Rather, for the church fathers, the key intellectual category was that of
“’Church’ (Greek and Latin, ecclesia), for the structured – and dynamic – community that
was injected into” the less formalized classical world.75 In his treatment, Marsilio
Ficino’s 1471 De Christiana Religione is a watershed in the evolution towards a
recognizable concept of ‘religion,’ which includes the systematization of rituals and
communities, and an emphasis on interior belief. From the seventeenth century onwards,
“Europeans and especially the leaders of their thought […] gave the name ‘religion’ to
the system, first in general but increasingly to the system of ideas, in which men of faith
were involved or with which men of potential faith were confronted.”76
Early modernists did not immediately incorporate Smith’s broad insights into their
studies; however, by 1990, both David Pailin and Peter Harrison had written important
monographs which firmly asserted that comparative religious thought emerged from early
modern intellectual culture. This was an historiographic innovation for their more
specialized audiences. As Harrison mildly complains in ‘Religion’ and the Religions in
the English Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1990), even Eric Sharpe’s seminal history of
comparative religion devoted only three pages to early modern thinkers.77 For Harrison,
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comparative religious thought evolved as Protestant sacred histories – which used a
comparative method to equate Catholicism with Jewish, Muslim, and ‘pagan’ heresies –
gave way to natural history, which used organic metaphors adapted from the new natural
sciences to investigate religious institutions as natural phenomena.78
The architecture of Harrison’s argument is quite traditional; nevertheless, it was
constructed in part using the tools of postmodern theory. He places the emergence of
comparative religious thought in seventeenth-century England for a number of reasons:
English writers enjoyed a broader religious freedom than most of their continental peers;
the monarchs’ oscillation between Protestantism and Catholicism undermined the
inevitability of a singular religious identity, and led to comparisons of the two; and
English scholars practiced a particularly robust form of Biblical criticism, that served to
historicize and localize their own religious truth claims.79 However, early modern travel,
and the ensuing efforts of European scholars to ‘understand’ the religions and histories of
North American, African, and Asian peoples, was another key component in the
emergence of comparative religious thought.80 “As the religious rites and beliefs of other
peoples were discovered […] the possible scope for comparison continued to increase.” 81
As Edward Said has pointed out with regard to ‘the Orient’, the discursive creation of
exotic locations and peoples provided the modern West with a backdrop upon which to
project images which served some domestic ideological function.82 Early modern
scholars and polemicists, Harrison argues, defined ‘true religion’ through a comparative
process of ‘othering’ directed at both “competing Christian factions” and at non-Christian
peoples.83
As Harrison himself notes, David Pailin’s Attitudes to Other Religions: Comparative
Religion in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Britian (Manchester, 1984) was the
only prior work to argue for an early modern birthdate for comparative religious
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thought.84 Unlike Harrison, Pailin does not directly cite Smith as a touchstone; however,
the impact of The Meaning and End of Religion is discernible in his treatment of Islam.
For Smith, the history of Islam represented a strong potential challenge to his broader
argument that the ‘religions of the world’ emerged through European scholarly practices.
“The Muslim world” is “definitely and explicitly conscious of something that it calls, and
is persuaded that it ought to call, a religion,” and there is undeniable linguistic and
historical evidence that Muslims have self-identified as a distinct community since the
emergence of Islam in the seventh century CE.85 Accordingly, Smith treats Islam as a
“special case” – unlike Buddhists or Hindus (he argues), Muslims have always
understood themselves as a distinct community, but that understanding, and especially its
contemporary form, has emerged in part as a process of self-identification in relation to
outsiders.86 Similarly, Pailin argues that although early modern Christian accounts of
other religious groups were unapologetically triumphalist, there were “two religions
which could not be so cavalierly dismissed – Judaism and Islam.”87 For seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century apologists, the remarkable cultural and military vitality of the Muslim
kingdoms meant that Islam presented an unavoidable ideological challenge. “Jacob
Bryant, for example, describes Islam as the only possible competitor with Christianity
while William Paley sees ‘the success of Mahometanism’ as ‘the only event’ in the
history of humanity that bears comparison with the spread of Christianity.”88 As a result,
early modern accounts of Islam had the unusual responsibility of showing “that it [did]
not pose a real threat to the rational establishment of the truth of Christianity.”89
Following Pailin and Harrison, early modern scholars did not re-engage with the
history of comparative religion until Guy Stroumsa’s A New Science: The Discovery of
Religion in the Age of Reason (Harvard, 2010). Stroumsa claims that “the modern science
of religion was not born, as is usually thought, in the second half of the nineteenth
century,” but rather “that the period between Renaissance and Romanticism is the crucial
Harrison, “Religion” and the Religions in the English Enlightenment, 176 n.2.
Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 82; 80-84.
86
Ibid., 117–118 and passim, ch. 4, "The Special Case of Islam.”
87
David A Pailin, Attitudes to Other Religions: Comparative Religion in Seventeenth- and EighteenthCentury Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 62.
88
Ibid., 81.
89
Ibid.
84
85

25

26

one in European intellectual history for the first emergence and early formation of the
modern study of religion.”90 The obvious similarity to Peter Harrison’s contention twenty
years earlier speaks to the cicada-like cycle of scholarly interest in early modern
comparative religion.
According to Stroumsa, the “epistemological foundations” for the comparative study
of religion were laid by three revolutionary early modern events: the “Great Discoveries,
initially of the Americas and then South and East Asia,” the impact of humanistic
scholarly methods, especially antiquarianism and philology, and the early modern wars of
religion.91 Like Harrison, Stroumsa argues that European contact with Asian and
American cultures was a fundamental catalyst for a comparative epistemology. Unlike
Harrison, however, for whom comparative religious thought was a polemical tool for
confessional Christian writers, Stroumsa frames early modern comparative thought
within a secularizing narrative. For Stroumsa, the experience of encountering unfamiliar
religious cultures – whether through ‘rediscovered’ classical texts, travel narratives, or
early ethnographic scholarship – necessitated new comparative modes of thought, and
prompted scholars to set aside older theological lenses. Although occasionally imperfect,
this new-found objectivity allowed early modern scholars to “overcome, at least to some
extent, their personal attitudes and prejudices.”92
This secularizing narrative is one that has been extensively critiqued by
contemporary scholars; as noted above, a new generation of intellectual historians has
fundamentally challenged the teleological assumption that early modern, Enlightened
scholarship was defined by secularity.93 As Jonathan Sheehan recently observed, “[t]o
open theology up—to make it less orthodox in our scholarship—seems to me a key
project of intellectual history at this particular juncture, when an older secular
dispensation is crumbling and new intellectual formations are not yet on the horizon.”94
Stroumsa goes further, however, by arguing that early modern comparative religion was
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not only non-theological, but that it was non-political as well: for Stroumsa, early modern
scholarly interest in ‘other’ religions was not motivated by either politics or polemics, but
by profound “intellectual curiosity” and “deep personal involvement with the subject of
their inquiry.”95
It should come as little surprise that the foil for this claim is Edward Said’s
Orientalism. Stroumsa argues that, while “the birth of orientalism in France and England,
for instance, is certainly related to imperialist designs and attitudes,” this fails to account
for the intense personal curiosity that leads a scholar to invest her career in a particular
avenue of study.96
The most important articulation of this argument occurs in relation to early modern
Orientalism. The sixth chapter, titled “From Mohammedis Imposturae to the Three
Imposters: The Study of Islam and the Enlightenment,” summarizes several of the literary
and scholarly genres through which early modern Europeans engaged with Islamic
history and thought. Usefully, Stroumsa points out that these engagements took three
forms: travel literature by authors like Jean Chardin and Jospeh Pitts,97 the textual
scholarship of Arabists like Edward Pocoke,98 and philosophical engagements with
Islamic thought by Jean Bodin, Rousseau, and others.99 On the surface, this chapter might
strike us as a catalogue of authors, rather than a sustained interpretation of their writing.
His underlying argument, however, is that these textual and scholarly engagements with
Islam were motivated by intellectual curiosity, not politics or imperialism. “It was this
intellectual curiosity, rather than the wish to lend support to imperialistic designs,
characteristic of a later period, that sustained the remarkable achievements of the early
orientalists.”100 Conversely, scholarly attacks on Islam were the result of imperfect
secularity, the inability or unwillingness to “completely shed prejudice and inherited
perceptions of Muhammed and Islam.”101
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1.5.4 Arabic and Orientalist scholarship in seventeenth-century England
In short, although early modernists have engaged (albeit fitfully) with the history of
comparative religious thought, those scholars have not investigated the possibility that a
seventeenth-century epistemology of comparative religion was related to European
imperialism or universalism. Indeed, one of the central arguments of the most recent
monograph on the subject, Stroumsa’s A New Science, was to actively deny this
possibility. When we turn to the literature on early modern Orientalist and Arabic
scholarship, we find that this approach has been largely replicated.
Between the 1970s and 1990s, studies of early modern Arabic scholarship adopted a
wide-angle perspective on the field. In Studies in the History of the Near East (Frank
Cass, 1973), Peter Holt offered an important overview of Arabic scholarship in England
during the seventeenth century. Arabic scholarship flourished in England prior to the
Civil War under the patronage of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and pious lay people;
professorships in Arabic were endowed at both Oxford (1636) and Cambridge (1632),
and Oxford’s Bodleian Library rapidly acquired one of the major European collections of
Arabic manuscripts. According to Holt, the motivations behind this flurry of scholarship
were religious. The study of Arabic, it was thought, would contribute to biblical
scholarship by “throwing new light on Hebrew,” a justification which was cited by every
English chair in Arabic during the seventeenth century.102 Arabic was also seen as an
important language of polemic, not only for evangelizing amongst Muslims, but also for
œcumenical outreach to Coptic and Maronite Christians in Egypt and the Levant.103
Although Holt takes a broad view of early modern Arabic scholarship, he focuses on
Edward Pococke, who occupied the Laudian professorship in Arabic at Oxford from 1636
until his death in 1691. In fact, of the three chapters dedicated to early modern Arabists,
the first is a biography of Pococke, the second focuses on the study of Islamic history as a
background to Pococke’s scholarship, and the short third chapter outlines the study of
Arabic in England after Pococke. For Holt, Pococke’s academic career both reflected and
summarized the history of Arabic scholarship in seventeenth-century England. Following
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the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, Arabic studies declined precipitously, a trend
which he juxtaposes against the fact that Pococke “produced no further works of Arabic
scholarship after 1663.”104
Holt attributes this decline in professional Arabic scholarship to a number of factors.
Despite the thriving commercial networks between England and the Muslim polities in
North Africa and the Mediterranean – trade with the Ottomans represented fully onequarter of English foreign trade by 1700105 – Arabic never became a necessary
commercial language for English merchants, who preferred to conduct their business
through translators.106 Accordingly, the study of Arabic was motivated almost solely by
religious and scholarly factors, which dissipated by the mid-century. Holt argues that
Arabic became less relevant to Biblical scholarship in the post-restoration context, and
that the “record of unrelieved failure” of English missionaries to the Muslim polities
undermined the evangelical rationale for Arabic study.107
This historical narrative – that Arabic studies flourished under Church patronage
during the 1630s-1640s, reached their English zenith in the career of Edward Pococke,
and sputtered disappointingly by the end of the century – has proved durable in
subsequent scholarship. In Eastern Wisedome and Learning: The Study of Arabic in
Seventeenth-Century England (Clarendon, 1996), G.J. Toomer also places Pococke at the
apex of a parabola-like narrative of Arabic scholarship in seventeenth-century England.
He does expand upon Holt’s narrative in several useful ways, however. Like Holt,
Toomer argues that the study of Arabic flourished in England prior to the revolution in
1640; however, he also notes that the reasons for that intensification of interest remain
somewhat unclear. It is not apparent, for instance, why Archbishop Laud invested so
aggressively in Arabic scholarship during the 1630s; in the absence of a “relevant […]
pronouncement of his own,” Toomer is obliged to speculate that Laud might have been
influenced by Peter Turner, the Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford.108
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Furthermore, whereas Holt argued that Arabic was irrelevant to English commerce,
Toomer implies that Arabic scholarship was at least tangentially related to commercial
interests. Famously, although he was largely ignored, Laud ordered the Levant Company
in 1634 to contribute one Arabic manuscript to his growing collection with every
returning ship.109
Toomer also seeks to explain the “gradual and then rapid decline” of Arabic studies
following the restoration.110 For the most part, he considers Holt’s explanation
compelling, although he suggests that Holt may have assigned too much significance to
the failure of English missionaries– after all, “whatever the lack of success of the
missionary efforts by Englishmen […] in Muslim countries, this had very little impact on
their continuation.”111 In fact, during the eighteenth century, the Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge continued to enthusiastically finance the translation of missionary
texts into Arabic.112 Like Holt and Stroumsa, however, he ultimately concludes that both
the intensification and decline of Arabic studies were the consequence of individual
scholarly interest. Although scholars like Pococke clearly saw themselves as contributors
to a broader Christian project, “their primary motivation was intellectual rather than
utilitarian.”113
More recent scholarship has taken a much narrower view than either Holt or Toomer,
focusing on specific scholars or intellectual circles, rather than the full scope of Arabic
scholarship during the seventeenth century. For instance, the papers submitted to an
edited collection on The Republic of Letters and the Levant (Brill, 2005), focus on topics
such as “Arabick Learning in the Correspondence of the Royal Society, 1660-1677,”114 or
attempt to explain Archbishop Laud’s personal motivations for endowing the Oxford
chair in Arabic in 1636.115 Despite the shift in foci, however, these more recent scholars
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persist in viewing early modern Arabic and Orientalist scholarship as non-political. M.B.
Hall, for instance, details the early Royal Society’s efforts to collect both scientific data
and Arabic and Persian manuscripts in the Muslims polities. Henry Oldenburg, the
“extremely conscientious” Secretary of the Royal Society from 1662-1677, actively
solicited reams of medical, botanical, ethnographic, and textual information from
members of the Society travelling in the Ottoman empire and North Africa. In 1672, for
instance, the Society assigned John Finch a bulletin of “Some Inquiries for Turky”
following his appointment to the ambassadorship in Istanbul. Their scholarly wish-list
focused on botanical questions, but also instructed Finch “To procure some curious
copies of [th]e Vulgar Greek Testament & Liturgies: The Alcoran in Arabic finely writ,
as it is sent to Mecha, & Whether some Gr.[eek] MSS, auncient & unknowne it among
us, may not yet be found about those Learned Ruines.”116 However, Hall argues, their
interest in this knowledge was purely scholarly, and “unravelled” once English natural
scientists lost interest in Arabic medical and astronomical sources.117
In the same collection, Mordechai Feingold assesses Archbishop Laud’s motivations
for patronizing Arabic scholarship. Ultimately, he offers an even more de-politicized
explanation than either Hall, Holt, or Toomer. While Laud and other benefactors were
clearly intrigued by scholarship for its own sake, Feingold argues that the commonality
between early modern patrons of Orientalist scholarship “was their failure to produce a
male heir. […] No great psychological acumen is needed to realize that in their twilight
years these men were opting for an alternative route to immortality.”118
While Feingold’s pseudo-Freudian reading is idiosyncratic, it is consonant with the
broader literature we have surveyed in two important respects. First, as we have seen with
Holt and his successors, scholars have remained wedded to a narrative in which Arabic
and Orientalist scholarship declined rapidly following the restoration. However, this
narrative is an uneasy fit with Anders Ingram’s important realization that English
publishing on ‘the Turk,’ and on Islam more broadly, intensified in the decades following
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the restoration. In fact, as we mentioned earlier, references to ‘the Turk’ proliferated
dramatically during the 1680s. During that decade, the normalised frequency of ‘the
Turk’ in English print reached 185/million words; during the 1630s, the decade which
Holt and others consider the high-water mark for English Arabists, the normalized
frequency was fewer than 50/million words.119 In other words, the historiographic
narrative of declining interest in Arabic and Islam only holds up if we narrowly focus on
the publications of professional academics. Even Holt’s claim that “Pococke produced no
further works of Arabic scholarship after 1663” is only true if we discount his later
missionary work.120 As Holt himself noted, Pococke translated both the Anglican
catechism and the liturgy into Arabic later in his career, in 1671 and 1674, respectively.121
Second, Feingold’s Freudianism is simply a distortion of the broader historiographic
tendency to de-politicise not only early modern Orientalism, but comparative religious
scholarship as well. Consistently, in the writing of Harrison, Stroumsa, Holt, and Toomer,
we find it argued that early modern scholars studied comparative religion, Arabic, and
Islam for their own sake, motivated by either personal intellectual curiosity or religious
commitments, but never by political interests.
This flies in the face of an ongoing ‘turn to empire’ amongst early modern historians.
Indeed, although early modernists have found it incredibly productive to ‘think with
empire,’ intellectual historians have tended to limit their engagements with imperialism
strictly to early scientific thought. As David Armitage recently observed, in the
“shorthand histories of political thought […] the main links between empiricism and
imperialism were generally found in the work of Francis Bacon and the seventeenthcentury Royal Society.”122
In short, the possible links between seventeenth-century Islamic scholarship and
European imperialism and universalism have gone unexplored. In light of our previous
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examination of the literature on nineteenth-century intellectual history, this seems
surprising, considering that it is impossible to write about Orientalism during the
nineteenth century without reference to the political context of European imperialism and
universalism. At a result, by positing a connection between Orientalism and imperialism
in John Finch’s manuscripts, this thesis is positioned precisely at a moment of silence in
the contemporary literature.123
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Chapter 1: John Finch (1626-82): A biographical overview
Although some recent scholarship has begun to examine John Finch’s contributions to
natural philosophy, this literature has been framed in relation to the history of philosophy.
Because Finch is virtually unknown to historians of political thought, this chapter offers a
brief biographical sketch, in which I overview both his career, and his treatment by
historians during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I begin by glossing Finch’s
biography prior to being appointed the English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire,
before turning to an account of his embassy. Subsequent historians, especially those
writing in the early twentieth century, have been profoundly disparaging of his diplomatic
career; in my view, it is important to understand his career in the broader context of
jurisdictional disputes between the Levant Company, the English crown, and the Ottoman
Porte. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of his relationship with Thomas Baines, and
the implications of their relationship for my analysis of their manuscripts.

2.1 Finch’s personal life
Finch was born in 1626, and was educated at Eton and Christ’s College, Cambridge,
where he graduated M.A. in 1649. While at Cambridge, he belonged to a circle of
students surrounding Henry More, who introduced him to an older physician named
Thomas Baines. Finch and Baines became lifelong partners, living together for thirty-six
years, until Baines’ death in 1681/1092 (see Appendix A for a schematic of Finch’s
network).124 Between 1651 and 1671, they lived in Italy, where Finch held several
diplomatic postings, and possibly performed some intelligence work on behalf of Henry
Bennet, the earl of Arlington and Secretary of State for the Southern Department.
Because Finch’s career unfolded in two distinct phases – he and Baines worked in
Italy as medical doctors from 1651-1671, and in Turkey from 1674-1681/1085-1092,
during his tenure as the Ottoman ambassador – subsequent scholars have not understood
his career holistically, and have tended to treat him either as a natural philosopher or as a
diplomat. Between 1917 and 1920, Archibald Malloch and G.F. Abbot published short
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biographies which focused on his diplomatic career.125 By contrast, more recent scholars
have been primarily interested in his earlier career as a natural philosopher. Within the
last fifteen years, historians of philosophy, particularly Sarah Hutton and Stefano Villani,
have written about Finch in relation to his much more famous half-sister, the philosopher
Anne Conway, and in the context of intellectual exchanges between Italy and England.126
As Sarah Hutton has noted, during his time in Italy, Finch played a role as “a link
between the scientific communities of England and Italy,”127 in addition to his work as an
anatomist, medical doctor, and lecturer at the Universities of Pisa and Florence. 128 In
1663, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society, with which he corresponded
throughout much of his professional life; he was also a member of its Italian equivalent,
the Florentine Accademia del Cimento, in recognition of his work as an anatomist.129 It
seems unlikely, however, that he fulfilled that role to the great satisfaction of either his
English or his Italian peers. In 1666-8, Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal
Society, was forced to write to Finch three times, requesting that he present a copy of the
History of the Royal Society to Prince Leopold; Finch eventually replied in 1668, and
claimed (unconvincingly) that he had just received Oldenburg’s earlier letters.130 As one
scholar has argued, “rather than becoming the celebrated promoter of exchanges between
the Cimento and the Royal Society, [Finch] was possibly an obstacle to
communication.”131
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Although this thesis is concerned with Finch’s writing during his ambassadorship to
the Ottoman empire, there is a case to be made that neatly identifying and distinguishing
between two phases of his career is not helpful. As William Bulman has noted, early
modern travellers were often simultaneously scholars, missionaries, and spies132; in
Finch’s case, the existence of several long reports on current affairs written in 1657,
when Finch and Baines held university appointments at Padua, suggests that he may have
been involved in intelligence-gathering and politics well before receiving a formal
diplomatic appointment.133
Although he and Baines remained in Italy until 1671, Finch sought an opportunity to
return to England as early as 1668. Following the adjournment of Parliament in 1668, his
brother-in-law, Edward Conway, spoke to Secretary of State Arlington on his behalf, and
urged Arlington to consider Finch for a diplomatic appointment.134 Conway was
apparently confident that his intercession would be fruitful, assuring Finch that he would
“have the advantage of coming into a court where there is not one man of ability.”135 On
July 30, 1670, Finch was appointed to the newly-formed Council for Foreign Plantations,
which was responsible for supervising the British colonies in North America.136 Two
years later, in November 1672, Finch was appointed to succeed Daniel Harvey as the
English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire137; he lived in Istanbul from 1674/1084 until
1681/1091, when he returned to England following Baines’ death.138
Unfortunately, Finch’s personal papers have largely been lost. S.C. Lomas, who
compiled many of Finch’s extant papers for the Historical Manuscripts Commission in
1922, suggested that many of his in-papers were destroyed in 1681, when he returned to
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England from Istanbul severely ill.139 It seems likely that the second half of his
correspondence with Edward Conway was lost at this point; consequently, while Conway
obviously solicited Finch and Baines for reports on Islamic governance, his intentions for
doing so are unclear. When Finch died in 1682, his papers and library were left to his
nephew Daniel, second earl of Nottingham, who moved them to his new manor at
Burley-on-the-Hill in 1700.140 Between 1913 and 1965, the Historical Manuscripts
Commission issued a four-volume survey of the manuscripts housed at Burley; vol. II,
published in 1922, includes their survey of John Finch’s remaining papers. The HMC
reported that “[n]o Letter-book of his has been found at Burley, and the only letters
approaching a consecutive series are those to his nephew Daniel, calendared from the
originals, preserved by the recipient.”141 Moreover, Finch’s library was destroyed in a fire
at Burley in 1908; fortunately, however, two extensive, albeit undated, catalogues have
survived in his personal notebooks.142 Finally, as we have noted, Finch’s treatise was
never published, and it is unclear whether or not he would have attempted publication if
he had not died suddenly.143 Indeed, to add insult to injury, the authorship of the treatise
was misattributed to Finch’s much more prominent nephew, Daniel Finch, until 1968. 144
The papers which survive include his official correspondence as ambassador, archived in
The National Archive, his correspondence with Edward and Anne Conway, archived in
the British Library, and amongst the Finch papers in the Record Office for Leicester,
Leicestershire, and Rutland.

2.2 Finch’s ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire, 1672-1681
The ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire, which was simultaneously a dominant
Eurasian imperial power and one of England’s largest trading partners, was a prestigious
and complex role. Finch’s major diplomatic accomplishment was to successfully
renegotiate the Capitulations in 1675/1086, the document establishing England’s trade
privileges with the Ottoman Empire. These privileges, first granted to William Harborne
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in 1580/987, were re-negotiated in 1601/1009, 1607/1015, 1612/1020, 1618/1027,
1641/1050, 1647/1056, and 1662/1672; the version secured by Finch “was a cumulative
text” that consolidated these earlier privileges, and was essentially unrevised until the
abolition of the Ottoman Capitulations in 1924.145
As the English ambassador, Finch simultaneously played a commercial role as the
Levant Company’s representative in Istanbul. Under the terms of the trade monopoly
granted to the Levant Company by James I in 1605, the Company was also responsible
for diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire; practically, this involved maintaining
and renegotiating the trade Capitulations, providing consular services to British residents
and travelers in the Ottoman empire, and interceding in legal and commercial disputes on
their behalf. This diplomatic relationship existed until 1825, when the “Levant Company
was wound up and the consular service passed into the control of the Foreign Office.”146
Especially in the context of the history of empire, it is important to stress that, during
the period under consideration, European Christian kingdoms were firmly the ‘junior
partner’ in their diplomatic relationships with the Ottoman Empire. This inequality was a
defining feature of the legal relationship between the English and Ottoman crowns; both
legally and rhetorically, the Capitulations which governed Anglo-Ottoman trade were
unilaterally granted to the English. “They were still very much privileges granted by the
benevolence of the Ottoman government, rather than terms demanded by the British,”
and the freedoms of movement and religion that the British enjoyed in the Empire
depended “entirely on Britain maintaining peaceful relations with the Ottomans.”147 In
fact, the Capitulations granted by the Ottomans were prefaced by an historical narrative,
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recounting Elizabeth I’s overture during the 1580s: “In the past, the chief of the nobles of
the queen of the said province [vilāyet] [of England] came to and arrived at our threshold
of the workings of felicity […] with her gentlemen and her ships with her tribute, and the
gifts that she had sent were gladly accepted.”148
As the representative of a moderately wealthy kingdom, living in the imperial capital
of one of the two hegemonic Eurasian empires, Finch would have possessed little of the
imperious mindset that characterized European Christian relations with the Muslim
kingdoms after the mid-eighteenth century. It is telling that, in the course of renegotiating
the Capitulations between 1674-1675/1086-1087, one of his priorities was to revise the
translation of Charles II’s title from kral (‘king’) to padişah (‘emperor’).149 The
imbalance of commercial and military power shaped Anglo-Ottoman cultural relations as
well. Gerald MacLean has characterized the cultural, military, and aesthetic relationship
between the English and the Ottomans as one of ‘imperial envy.’150 For the early modern
English, the Ottoman Empire was “the fabulously wealthy and magnificent court from
which the sultan ruled over three continents with his great and powerful army.”151
Although Christian polemicists saw the Ottomans as “the great enemy and scourge of
Christendom,” they were nevertheless forced to reckon with the indisputable fact of
Ottoman imperial power. Only during the eighteenth century would European Christians
feel confident “to draw, paint, poeticize and imagine the Muslims the way they liked;”
during the seventeenth century, “Muslims had a power of self-representation which
English authors knew they either had to confront or to engage.”152
Previous historians have been unsparing in their evaluation of Finch’s success as an
ambassador; one scholar, writing in the 1920s, concluded that Finch “was not born for
diplomacy: certainly not for Turkish diplomacy. […] That he failed at Constantinople
cannot be disguised.” 153 In my view, however, while Finch seems to have been
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underprepared for his ambassadorship,154 his tenure was crippled by a series of bitter
jurisdictional disputes provoked by the fractious Levant Company.
Between the 1660s-1680s, the Levant Company and the English crown engaged in a
protracted jurisdictional “tussle for control of the embassy” in Istanbul.155 Following the
Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the Levant Company – which had flourished under
Cromwell – was suspected of Presbyterian sympathies, and of potential “resistance to
royal authority.” 156 Accordingly, Charles II made a concerted effort to reassert the
monarch’s jurisdiction over the Company, particularly his prerogative to appoint the
ambassador, and to ensure religious conformity amongst the Company’s merchants.
Finch’s family, which was “impeccably Tory and High Church,” was deeply
involved in this effort to reassert monarchical control over the company.157 During the
interregnum, Heneage Finch (1628-1689), John Finch’s first cousin, had led an
underground network of Royalist sympathizers in Kent; in 1660, he became Charles II’s
first ambassador to the Ottoman empire.158 Steven Pincus characterizes Heneage Finch as
the central figure in an “Anglican crusade” intended to purge the Company of
nonconformist or disloyal merchants.159 As part of that political program, Finch strongly
asserted the monarch’s sole right to appoint the ambassador in Istanbul. In 1668, he
prepared a “Narrative [of the] Levant Companie’s Proceedings with the Crowne,” which
railed against the Company’s “arrogancy […] as if they were a Little Republiq[u]e […] to
pretend to one of [th]e Supreame Praerogatives of yo[u]r Crowne, Viz. The Election of
[th]e Ambassadours for Turky.”160
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Heneage Finch was succeeded in 1669 by Sir Daniel Harvey, who was related to him
by marriage; upon his death in 1672, Harvey was in turn replaced by John Finch.161 In
this context, Finch’s appointment was not simply a matter of individual patronage. His
family had been closely associated with the position for over a decade; and especially
through Heneage Finch’s ambassadorship, had positioned itself as fierce advocates for
religious conformity and the royal supremacy. Further, he was only appointed after
Edward Conway assured the Secretary of State, lord Arlington, of his royalist
convictions.162 In other words, Finch was explicitly intended to serve as ‘the king’s man’
in Istanbul: this close association with religious conformity and the royal supremacy in
England provides important context for his later writing on Islam, the Ottoman Empire,
and sovereignty.
Finch’s ambassadorship began to unravel in 1678/1088, when he was unwillingly
thrust into a legal dispute between the Company and Ottoman authorities. As the English
ambassador, one of Finch’s responsibilities was to advocate for English subjects residing
in the Ottoman empire, in both legal and commercial matters. In 1678/1088, a prominent
English merchant in Istanbul named Samuel Pentlow died suddenly, before formally
settling his will. Pentlow had married an Ottoman Greek Orthodox woman; ordinarily, as
the widow of an English merchant, she would have fallen under English legal
jurisdiction, and been subject to English estate law. However, because Pentlow had
failed to confirm his wife’s status with the Ottoman authorities before he died, she
remained within Ottoman legal jurisdiction.163 Under pressure from several of the English
merchants associated with the Levant Company, Finch considered helping Pentlow’s
widow relocate to England, to the intense displeasure of the Ottoman authorities. In
1678/1088, he received a sharply-worded letter from the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Ḳara
Muṣṭafā Paşa, warning him “That wee have understood, how you had thoughts of sending
into England, contrary to [th]e Imperiall Capitulations, [th]e wife & child of a Subject, of
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Our most valerous & Majesticall Emperor […] Keepe a good correspondence, & for [th]e
future act nothing in this manner contrary to [th]e estasblish[e]d accord.”164
Finch subsequently decided to completely recuse himself from the situation – as we
have discussed, the Levant Company’s ability to trade in the Ottoman Empire was
entirely dependent on the English crown maintaining a healthy relationship with the
Ottoman Porte. However, his decision outraged the English merchant community, and
presented the Levant Company with a fresh opportunity to challenge the monarch’s
jurisdiction over the embassy. Paul Rycaut, formerly the consul at Izmir, petitioned the
king to replace Finch, “for, among things, not having done enough to protect Pentlow”
and his widow.165 In 1679, the Company unilaterally “determined to replace Finch with
Baron Chandos;” although deeply displeased, Charles II confirmed the appointment in
1680.166 While awaiting Chandos’ arrival, Finch was almost entirely sidelined by the
Ottomans, and was forced to report to the Levant Company that “I had reason to conclude
that His Excell[en]cy My Successour […] was likely in all reason to effect more than
I.”167

2.3 John Finch and Thomas Baines
One of the most intriguing elements of Finch’s personal and professional lives is his
nearly life-long relationship with Thomas Baines. As mentioned earlier, Finch and Baines
were introduced at Cambridge in 1645 by their tutor, the Cambridge Platonist Henry
More, when Finch was nineteen and Baines twenty-three. The two men lived together
almost uninterrupted for the next thirty-six years, until Baines died on September 5,
1681.168
Unfortunately, very little is known about Baines outside of his relationship with Finch.
The ODNB, for instance, affords Baines a paragraph after the entry for Finch, and notes
that after they met in 1645, “his biography coincides with that of Finch.”169 Baines did
leave some unpublished papers, which have been archived along with Finch’s in the
TNA SP 105/109, f. 164, Ḳara Muṣṭafā Paşa to Finch, undated [1678/1088].
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Record Office for Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland, but it is likely that many of them
were abandoned after his death, when Finch returned to England.
Their relationship presents a unique historiographic challenge. Although Finch’s family
apparently prospected for a wife, neither man ever married; as one scholar has observed,
"[f]rom the vantage point of today, Finch and Baines certainly look like a gay couple.”170
It is impossible (and beside the point) to evaluate whether their relationship involved a
sexual dimension; however, it is clear that the two men were deeply committed to one
another. Following Baines’ death, Finch wrote in his diary that the loss had “cutt off the
thread of all my worldly happiness and application to business […] which irreparable loss
[…] reduced me to so much weaknesse that I was given over by my physician.”171
Although outside the scope of this thesis, their relationship has recently attracted some
attention amongst scholars of queer history.172 Throughout this thesis, I have referred to
Finch and Baines as 'partners,' in order to convey the duration, intimacy, and evident love
in their life-long relationship, without risking the historical anachronism of attempting to
define them in terms of sexual identity.
It is evident that, in some sense, the two men were accepted as a couple by their peers.
When Finch was dispatched to Florence in 1665, as the English minister to the Grand
Duke of Tuscany, there are some indications that the posting was jointly held with
Baines.173 During Finch’s embassy to the Ottomans, it was widely understood by both
English and Ottoman merchants that Baines was an extremely close and influential
confidant.174 While he was living in Istanbul, an English merchant named Dudley North
(1641-1691) observed that “John Finch (and, as must be understood, Sir Thomas
Baines)” had been appointed ambassador. After Finch died on November 18, 1682, he
170
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was buried alongside Baines in a joint tomb in the collegiate chapel of Christ’s College,
Cambridge: the inscription on their headstone was written by Henry More, and reads (in
part) “Duorum Amicissimorum, quibus Cor erat unum, anaq. Anima.”175
Especially in comparison to their married contemporaries, Finch and Baines’s
relationship strikes a modern researcher as surprisingly familiar: both personally and
professionally, theirs seems to have been an equal partnership. There is some indication
that upper-class English men who lived abroad, particularly in Italy, experienced a degree
of freedom from the norms of sexuality and relationships that would have been imposed
by their families in England.176 The two men relocated to Italy in 1651, and over the
course of the following thirty years, only lived in England for approximately three.177 As
a result, I do not think that the relative openness of their relationship, and its seeming
social acceptability, can be separated from the trajectory of Finch’s professional career.
Paradoxically, I would argue that their relationship could only be seen as an equal
partnership by their contemporaries – and hence, by modern researchers – precisely
because both were men. As noted above, there is evidence that both Finch and Baines
were consulted during the day-to-day operations of the embassy in Istanbul, and as elite
men, both moved freely in the rarified world of elite Ottoman sociability. By contrast,
Katherine Trumbull, who accompanied her husband William during his embassy to the
Ottomans between 1687-1691, was regularly present at social occasions, but was not
involved in ambassadorial decision-making.178
Because Finch and Baines lived with one another for their entire adult lives, there is,
naturally, no extant correspondence between the two. Unfortunately, this makes it
virtually impossible to determine how they influenced each other intellectually.179 In fact,
in his epitaph for Baines, Finch wrote that “our thoughts became so familiar to each other
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that sometimes wee forgot to whom they originally belonged.”180 Although the two men
were intellectually inseparable, there is no manuscript evidence that Finch’s papers –
especially his treatise, and his report on the Ottoman Empire – were co-authored.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know what has been lost of Baines’s papers. As
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the vast majority of the primary material I
have consulted was written by Finch: I have worked with approximately 800 pages of
Finch’s manuscripts, and approximately 30 pages written by Baines. Nevertheless, Baines
wrote two letters to Edward Conway, in 1676 and 1681, that reflect upon and
significantly clarify Finch’s intellectual project. It is to that project that we now turn.
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Chapter 2: Finch’s Political philosophy: Liberty, coercion, and
sovereignty
In his 1676 report for Edward Conway, Thomas Baines offered a striking metaphor for
statecraft. After a flowery apology for his tardy reply (like Finch, Baines was apparently
a terrible correspondent), he proceeds to argue that
Every ship ought to Lye with its’ Just Levell and Proportion in the water; but in
the first Fabrick and Disposition Some more some Lesse come short of the
Exactnesse of the Structure, which is to be amended by placing of the Ballast,
and the other Burthen it Carry’s more in one Place, then in Another […] My
Lord, there is not any Kingdome or Common wealth whatsoever, but by reason
of its fluctuating and unstable Condition may be compard’ to a Ship; And no
humour of People so equall and well temperd’ One to Another, but it requires a
Great Art to place the Ballast and Burthen They carry so proportionably that the
whole might Navigate the better; And this Ballast or Burthen is no other then the
Laws’ They Live Under.181
It is not surprising that Baines – a member of a diplomatic retinue from a maritime
nation – would reach for a nautical metaphor for statecraft. If we fully unpack his
analogy, however, a fundamental aspect of Finch and Baines’ political philosophy comes
into focus. For both men, stabilizing the ship of state was not only a matter of wise
navigation, but of judicious regulation and intervention on the part of its commanding
officers. To relax the ‘Ballast and Burthens’ placed upon its citizens would endanger the
ship of state, allowing it to list too far in any one direction: to stabilize the entire vessel,
to maintain its course in the choppy waters of post-Restoration politics, demanded that its
subjects be exposed to a heavy burden of law and governance. Finch’s political
philosophy, in other words, was not a theory which liberated the individual from
domination: it was a theory of governance which directly exposed individual subjects,
religious minorities, and the Church itself to the unified and unitary authority of the state.
In short, this ominous analogy prefigures the fundamental ecclesiological questions
which animated Finch’s political philosophy: What is the correct relationship between the
state and minority religious groups? And, what is the correct relationship between church
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and state; or more precisely, between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities within a
state?
Finch never explicitly asked these questions in his own writing. However, when they
are utilized as an interpretive hermeneutic, his seemingly idiosyncratic (and occasionally
bizarre) account of contemporary politics and the Ottoman empire comes into focus as a
concrete philosophy of empire. In order to rapidly expand and consolidate an empire,
Finch advocated for a policy of robust state intervention in the public and private lives of
its subjects. To avoid civil unrest, he proposed a policy of state toleration for minority
religious beliefs; importantly, however, the right to liberty of conscience applied to
individual dissenters, not to minority religious groups. Indeed, for Finch, the correct
relationship between civil and ecclesiastical authority was one of state domination:
inspired by the Ottoman polity, he argued that civil peace could best be secured if the
monarch wielded both civil and religious authority.
Finch was far from alone in arguing that the interests of the state demanded strong
intervention into the public and private lives of its citizens. As Ethan Shagan has recently
argued, early modern English writers who called for religious toleration never did so
without asserting the state’s concomitant right to regulate private morality and public
behaviour. “Moderate toleration was a technique of government, not the withdrawal or
absence of government.”182 In this context, what distinguished Finch was not his call for
robust governmentality, but rather, the sources he drew upon in constructing that
argument, and the conclusions he drew as a result. Finch not only outlined a political
philosophy that bordered on authoritarian: he did so by synthesizing evidence drawn from
Ottoman history and politics. And by thoroughly incorporating his understanding of the
Ottoman empire into his political philosophy, Finch ultimately offered a coherent
‘blueprint’ for empire inspired by an Islamic model. For Finch, the Ottoman model of
moderate statecraft served a two-fold imperial interest: it enabled both conquest and the
continued stability and efficiency of an empire.
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As previously noted, while Finch has recently been noticed by historians of
philosophy, his career as a diplomat and a political thinker has been largely overlooked.
Accordingly, while this thesis cannot claim to have ‘rediscovered’ Finch, the present
chapter is the first scholarly effort to seriously engage with his political writing. The first
section investigates Finch’s articulation of religious toleration as both a pragmatic tool of
statecraft, and an individual ‘Humane Right.’ Crucially, he defines the liberty of
conscience in such a way that it applies only to individuals, with significant implications
for both toleration and church government. In the second section, I excavate Finch’s
ecclesiology – his theological and political understanding of the church, its scope and
jurisdiction, and its relationship to the English state. Drawing on Ethan Shagan’s analysis
of moderate toleration, I illustrate how Finch juxtaposes a vigorous defense of religious
freedom, with an equally vigorous defense of the monarch’s near-total jurisdiction over
the church. By analysing Finch’s use of Ottoman history, his epistemological skepticism,
and his ecclesiology, he ultimately emerges as a political thinker for whom liberty and
coercion were equal partners in a broader theory of sovereignty.

3.1 Finch’s toleration: Pragmatism and rights
For early modern Britons, the legal toleration extended to minority religious groups by
the Ottoman Empire offered a striking contrast to their own society. As John Marshall
notes in his recent, magisterial work on Locke and toleration, Islam was “central to
tolerationist debates in England in the late seventeenth century,” in part because “the
practice of Muslim toleration for Christianity was repeatedly rehearsed by many
authors.”183
As a diplomat living in the Ottoman empire, Finch personally experienced and
benefited from the Ottoman policy of accommodating Christians. Indeed, the first and
most important article of the trade Capitulations which Finch renewed in 1675/1086
reaffirmed the imperial guarantee that “the said [English] nation, and the English
merchants […] in all security may come and go into any part of our dominions in such
sort, that neither any of the nation, their goods and faculties shall receive any hindrance
183
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or molestation from any person whatsoever.”184 However, in Finch’s mind, there had
never been any doubt that the Ottoman policy of accommodating Jews and Christians was
integral to their political and military successes. Writing to Edward Conway in 1663, he
reported that Christian peasants in Hungary were actively supporting the Ottomans in
their war against the Hapsburgs, in expectation of greater “freedome in the exercise of
their Religion” under Muslim rule.185
In his unpublished manuscripts, Finch explores the utility and legitimacy of religious
toleration in detail. Historically, he argued, religious oppression undermines civil
stability; conversely, toleration enables conquest and effective government. He also
offered a robust defense of the individual’s right to liberty of conscience, on epistemic
and theological grounds. In the following sections, I examine Finch’s articulation of
toleration as both a pragmatic instrument of statecraft, and as a matter of ‘Humane
Right’.
3.1.1 The lessons of history: Toleration, empire, and pragmatism
Finch’s politique philosophy of religious toleration is underwritten by a cyclical model of
history. He was especially concerned with two fundamental historical patterns: the
oscillation of power between religious and civil authorities, and the historical conditions
which enabled civil unrest and regime change. For Finch, the operative variable for both
patterns was the expansion and retraction of religious freedoms: accordingly, he argued,
extending the liberty of conscience to religious dissenters was a technique of wise
governance.
Finch’s understanding of ecclesiastical history posits a complex relationship between
religion and the stability of civil government. On the one hand, government cannot exist
without religion to secure the loyalty and obedience of the populace. In his manuscript
treatise, Finch wrote that the Roman Empire became the “Seat of the greatest Universall
Power that Ever was known either in Temporall or Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction” precisely
because it subsumed the power of the Christian Church to the interests of the Empire.186
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Rome enjoyed a “Universall Monarchy Over Mankind” by combining the “Prerogatives
acquir’d by fears of Warr” with “ the Seat of the Head of the Ecclesiasticall Power,
w[hi]ch gives Rules to the thoughts, & Consequently the Souls of Men.” 187 His is a
darkly theocratic view of Roman imperium: the state enjoyed coercive power over its
subjects not only through the exercise of penal laws, but through its control of “the very
point w[hi]ch makes them Men, w[hi]ch is Reason & Religion.”188 In the contemporary
context, Finch argues, this civil right over ecclesiastical power has been devolved to the
national churches. “Rome was the Rule of Civility to its Governm[en]t: being [th]e Seat
of the Consuls, and afterwards the Emperours; as London is to England, and Paris is to
France.”189
Conversely, Finch was convinced that oppressing the individual liberty of conscience
was fatal to the stability of a civil polity. In his 1676 letter to Edward Conway, Thomas
Baines offered a pithy summary of this historical dynamic: “it Appears That Oppressions
in Civil Government have allway’s usherd’ in Changes of Religion; Not Religion the
Change of a well Temperd’ contented Government; For Government was the first Thing
intended by God, And that Upon necessary Grounds; for no Religion can stand without
Civill Governments; but Civill Government may be without any one particular
Religion.”190
Oppression, in other words, leads to civil unrest – and in extreme cases, Finch
argued, to regime change. Indeed, Finch placed this historical argument at the forefront of
his case for religious toleration. In his unpublished treatise, Finch offered a detailed gloss
of early church history, which characterized the incredible expansion of the early
Christian church as a direct response to Roman oppression. Importantly, however, he
argued that the subsequent stability of the Christianized Roman Empire only lasted “So
Long as Christians kept to this Doctrine of Christ, and the Governed rendred to the
Government also all Obedience either Active or Passive.”191
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The stability of the Christian Roman Empire was, therefore, dependent upon a
symbiotic but unequal partnership between Church and Empire. As discussed earlier,
Finch considered religion indispensable to Rome: it both legitimized the civil authorities,
and offered them an invaluable instrument of coercion. However, this symbiosis required
that the Church cede all civil jurisdiction to the Empire. For scriptural justification, Finch
leaned heavily on the Gospel of Matthew and Paul’s letter to the Romans, noting that
“Our Saviour who was King of Kings payd not onely Himselfe […] Tribute to Caesar of
a very different Opinion from His Doctrine, but enjoynd’ to all the rendring to Caesar
what was Caesars: And St Paul Rom:13 enjoyns to all Christians absolute obedience,
even for Conscience sake, to all Kings and Souvereign Authority’s.”192
Provocatively, Finch argued that the historical conditions which enabled the rapid
spread of Christianity repeated themselves during the seventh century CE/first century
AH. Just as the early Church overthrew the pagan Roman cult in the face of civil
oppression, the oppression of ‘Arrians’ by orthodox Trinitarians enabled Islam to
flourish. After the bishop of Rome claimed universal jurisdiction over all spiritual
matters, the church hierarchy erred fatally by attempting to “Lord it over the Consciences
of their fellow Christians in the same height of Jurisdiction and Persecution th[a]t
Heathen Rome Exercisd’.”193 In turn, both the Church and the Empire became vulnerable
to precisely the same civil unrest and internal divisions which had been earlier been
exploited by the Christians.
Importantly, however, Finch’s model of ecclesiastical history and religious toleration
was both cautionary and proscriptive. Persecuting the civil rights of religious dissenters,
as in the case of the Christianized Roman Empire, leaves an empire vulnerable to
rebellion and conquest. It was in precisely this context, Finch argues, that “Mahomet
[began] to promulgate His Doctrine,” which capitalized intelligently on Christian disunity
by offering religious toleration to the persecuted Arrian minority in the Levant and North
Africa.194 Fatally weakened by its own policy of religious intolerance, “Christianity was it
selfe pulld’ down by the same method in Asia and Africa that it had pulld’ down other
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Religions; and Mahumetanism quickly gave by introducing Liberty of Conscience to all
that deny Polytheisme Polytheisme (for they are obliged to cut of all th[a]t acknowledge
not one God) as great a Blow to Christianity, as that gave to Idolatrous Ethnicism
before.”195
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Finch’s historical analysis of toleration and empire is, therefore, a case study in the
virtue of peacefully accommodating religious dissenters. Promising religious liberty to
persecuted Arrian Christians enabled the rapid expansion of the early Islamic kingdoms,
but also consolidated their rule over ceded territories. In his view, it was thanks to the
“Liberty of Conscience to all different Religions that acknowledge But one God” that the
Ottomans “were assurd’ to keep the Conquests they had made; for nothing occasions such
desperate Revolts and dangerous attempts as the oppressing [th]e Conscience; w[hi]ch
being a Trade so universally practisd’ amongst Christians; the Turks find it a most
beneficiall one to them”.196
In Finch’s context, the clear implication of this historical account is that religious
intolerance on the part of the English state will, inevitably, undermine the stability of the
civil government. By juxtaposing the early Church’s self-imposed susceptibility to
Islamic toleration with contemporary English politics, he strongly implied that the
English state should consider religious toleration as a political strategy for avoiding a
second Civil War.197 Although Finch never made this connection explicit, Thomas Baines
was less coy in his 1676 report for Conway: “the Great Opposition which is made in
England against Catholicks, is not made by the greatest part of Men simply upon the
Score of Religion, but Upon the Score of Civill Rights.”198 While it is impossible to
tolerate the incursion of papal claims to ecclesiastical authority in England, the two men
were unambiguous that, in the interests of avoiding civil unrest and war, it was necessary
to avoid unnecessary burdens upon the liberty of conscience.
3.1.2 Toleration, skepticism, and ‘Humane Right’
On historical grounds, then, Finch was convinced that civil oppressions levied on
religious dissenters was a profound error of government. Religious intolerance fomented
internal rebellion, allowed ecclesiastical authorities to usurp the coercive powers of the
government, and exposed the state to external threats. It is also evident that he was
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impressed by the political efficacy of the Ottoman model for toleration. For Finch, the
‘Liberty of Conscience’ that the Ottomans extended to monotheists was essential to both
the rapid expansion and the ongoing durability of their empire. Although Finch seems to
have elided the early history of Islam with the contemporary Ottoman Empire, he did
have access to reasonably accurate sources on Islamic history in the form of Henry
Stubbe’s manuscripts (see above, n.15). Finally, in the context of the reports that he and
Baines wrote to Edward Conway, it is clear that both men saw toleration as a normative
principle of good government: toleration could stave off a second Civil War, and
contribute to a project of empire-building.
Finch also offered a robust philosophical case for the liberty of conscience as an
individual right, on both epistemic and theological grounds. In fact, he articulated three
arguments for a ‘Humane Right’ to the freedom of conscience, which I have described as
the argument from epistemic skepticism, the argument from interiority, and the argument
against coercion.199 This last argument is particularly pointed: in opposition to the
prevalent Augustinian view that religious coercion was both effective and justified, Finch
denied that it was either.
Finch’s first philosophical argument for toleration is grounded in his epistemic
skepticism. Although he firmly believed in the existence of incorporeal beings, including
God, angels, and the human soul, he rejected the possibility of generating any reliable
metaphysical knowledge. For Finch, all knowledge is derived through sense perception,
or from subsequent reflection upon sensory information, “it being impossible to
remember what is neither figurd’ in the mind by some Corporeall Shape; For the
Imagination cannot convey anything to the memory, but what has first Enterd’ into
itselfe; and therefore Every Object perceivd’ or understood, must be reppresented by
Corporiety be it never so subtile.”200 Sense perceptions are generated by the body’s
sensory organs – the ear, the eye, etc. – which are in turn delivered to the “Internal
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Perceiving Faculty” in the form of ‘signatures,’ which “function like the shapes that make
up letters of [the] alphabet.”201
On this epistemic basis, Finch distinguished between absolute and relative
knowledge. Because God, by definition, is unaffected by the epistemic limitations
imposed by imperfect and finite sensory organs, only God is capable of possessing
“Absolute Knowledge of any Being.”202 Humans, by contrast, are limited to “Relative
knowledge,” not only of metaphysics and the natural world, but also of “Divine &
Humane Truths being deliverd’ to Us by God Himselfe in Words, w[hi]ch can never
Exhibit precisely the same Idea” between believers.203 Accordingly, Finch argued that it
was “against Divine and Humane Right (since Man can understand Nothing but by
Words) to impose a necessity of Believing any Truth Reveald’ by God, or deliverd’ by
Man, exactly & Precisely according to the same Idea, without Latitude or Variation.”204
Finch’s epistemic skepticism also informs his argument from interiority. If humans
can only achieve relative epistemic certainty, then it follows that the “Interpretation of
Scripture” is subject to “the Judgm[en]t of every Private Man,” and “Neither the Doctrine
of the Church, nor the Interpretation of Scripture can be Infallibly enjoynd.’”205 As a
result, enforcing religious belief is not only epistemically irrational, but an unacceptable
usurpation of God’s authority. “God having reservd’ the Prerogative of καρδιογνῶσις206
to Himselfe, & not having given any Men the Power of knowing the Hearts of others, He
seems to give Men to understand, that what is in the Heart is out of their Jurisdiction and
Authority.”207 Since only God is capable of knowing “when the Conscience or Inward
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Man disobeys His Injunctions & Commands,” then only God has the right to “Impose
Lawes to bind […] the Conscience.”208
Finally, Finch supplies a thicket of arguments against the efficacy of enforcing
belief. Belief, he argues, is purely internal, and cannot be coerced, “[f]or Outward Tyes
upon Men, are like Prisons, Cords and Chains, w[hi]ch are Externall to their Bodyes,
They keep them no Longer in hold when there are able to breake Them.”209 Furthermore,
by definition, belief must be voluntary, for it is not the “Part of Religion to force
Religion; w[hi]ch ought to be undertaken voluntarily, not by compulsion, since the very
sacrifices are calld’ for from a Willing Mind.”210 Finally, he argues that compelling belief
has little effect besides turning a dissenter into a hypocrite, since “forcing a Man to an
Outward Profession contrary to His Inward Perswasion, is but to Improve the Guilt of
Him, who sayes He Believes what He does Not.”211
In the context of the late seventeenth century, it is important to note that Finch
argued that coercion is neither effective nor justified for the promotion of religious belief.
In his Treatise Concerning the Correction of the Donatists, Augustine offered a powerful
theological rationale for religious persecution, arguing for the legitimacy of correcting
unorthodox practices through force: “men should actually be compelled to the feast of
everlasting salvation […] He who is compelled is forced to go where he had no wish to
go, but when he has come in, he partakes of the feast right willingly.”212 This formulation
framed debates over religious toleration during the seventeenth century, and was
repeatedly cited by authors who sought to justify persecution. In his very public duel with
John Locke, for instance, Jonas Proast offered a qualified version of Augustine’s formula,
arguing that “though no force can compel men to embrace (if by that you mean, to
believe) the doctrine of others that differ from them, yet some force may induce those
who would not otherwise to hear what may and ought to move them to embrace the
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truth.”213 Ultimately, Finch offers a remarkably robust articulation of toleration as a
fundamental right. “Wee must confesse that God having created Man with freedome of
will or in manu Consily Sui in the hand of His own Counsell, The Conscience of Men
ought to be free, it being not in [th]e Power of man to take away or alter, that w[hi]ch was
the gift of God to Man as part of His Nature. […] Tis of Humane Right & Naturall
Power, for every one to Worship what he beleives. Nor does the Religion of another,
prejudice or profitt any Man.”214 This is a substantially more robust claim than simply
asserting the inefficacy of coercion, a position which would leave half of the Augustinian
formula unchallenged. By positing a ‘Humane Right’ to the individual liberty of
conscience, Finch firmly denied both the legitimacy and the efficacy of coercion for
promoting religious belief.

3.2 Toleration and ecclesiology: From liberty to coercion
Earlier, I suggested that Finch’s proposed toleration for the individual liberty of
conscience would prove significant. Although he offers a remarkably robust defense of
religious toleration, on historical, pragmatic, and philosophical grounds, we have not yet
asked how he defined ‘liberty of conscience.’ When we investigate Finch’s
presuppositions in greater detail, we find that his is a philosophy which prizes liberty and
coercion in equal measure – to paraphrase Ethan Shagan, it is a ‘subtly violent’
philosophy, in which state power and circumscribed liberty are equal partners in a theory
of sovereignty.215
In this section, I draw upon Shagan’s interpretation of tolerationist authors in
seventeenth-century England, in order to understand the relationship between liberty and
coercion in Finch’s thought. During the seventeenth century, the language of
‘moderation’ was a key element of political discourse in early modern England.
Traditionally, historians have taken early moderns at their word when they claim to be
‘moderate’: however, a host of new interpretive possibilities appear when we understand
that, in early modern England, ‘moderation’ was both a “state of equipoise and the act of
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restraint that produced it.”216 “Moderation had a variety of meanings in early modern
England, centred on ideas of restraint, limitation, governance, or control.
Paradigmatically, this meant self-restraint […] Yet moderation also meant external
restraint, quintessentially the kind enforced by authority upon those unable to moderate
themselves.”217
For our purposes, Shagan’s analysis of religious toleration is particularly vital.
During the seventeenth century, the defense of religious freedom was almost invariably
articulated alongside an “assault on immorality.”218 In An Address to Protestants upon the
Present Conjuncture (1679), for instance, William Penn vigorously defended religious
toleration, but simultaneously displaced moral behaviour from the jurisdiction of the
church, to an interest of the state. “Those impieties that relate more particularly to the
state to correct are drunkenness, whoredoms and fornications; excess in apparel and
furniture and living; profuse gaming; and finally oaths, profaneness and blasphemy.”219
This juxtaposition of liberty and moral restraint is not evidence that a given author
failed to fully secularize or liberalize his thought, nor is it a “byproduct of tolerationist
thought [or] a response to conservative criticism.” Rather, “[u]niveralising arguments for
religious toleration became moderate and hence virtuous precisely because they bridled
sin.”220 It is crucial to understanding Finch’s thought that “seventeenth century writers
[…] never imagined a toleration that was not always already a concomitant restraint; their
intellectual projects justified the state's toleration of certain dubious beliefs and practices
by arguing that such toleration more firmly established the state's capacity to restrain
other dubious beliefs and practices.”221
As I will argue, both the ends and the means of Finch’s theory of sovereignty are
ecclesiological. In order to eliminate theological differences between Christian
denominations, he argues for a sort of theological minimalism – a ‘lowest common
216
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denominator’ version of the church, to which any reasonable Christian could assent. In so
doing, he radically narrows the jurisdiction of the church, to such an extent that religious
communities have no independent authority over their own members. Religious freedom
is an individual right, not a communal right: an individual has the right to believe
whatever she pleases, but not to join a dissenting church.
This minimalist ecclesiology enables him to simultaneously advocate for the liberty
of conscience, on political, theological, and ecclesiological grounds, and for the
intolerance of dissenting or non-conforming Christian denominations. As a result, a
Christian monarch has total jurisdiction over every aspect of religion that is not strictly
interior: he has the right not only to demand conformity to the Church of England, but
also to assert his authority over the Church itself. Ultimately, for Finch, religious
toleration and religious oppression become complementary aspects of an imperial
ecclesiology.
3.2.1 Finch’s ecclesiology
According to Finch, Christianity can be reduced to three components: “No Church can be
deny’d to be a True Church, where the Faith of Christ is preachd’, The Sacraments are
rightly administred; and none of its Doctrines directly repugnant to the Word of God.”222
Ostensibly, this minimal version of Christianity is intended to secure the “peace of
Conscience and Peace of the Church,” by rendering the “divisions and animosity’s
w[hi]ch proceed from our Lusts Jam[es] 4:1” moot. 223 At the same time, this is an
extraordinarily narrow ecclesiological view. By “Reduc[ing] Things finally but to the
Holy Scriptures; and oblig[ing] Christians to nothing more then what is contained there,”
Finch excludes religious practices from the definition of ‘religion’ in a single stroke. 224
This ecclesiological minimalism has profound consequences for both the relationship
between the established church and the state, and for the practical utility of the
individual’s right to liberty of conscience.
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Because Finch defines the church as an organization that preaches the Christian faith
and administers the sacraments, the jurisdiction of the church is narrowly confined to
matters of internal belief. As a result, an extraordinarily broad category of religious
practices are extraneous to Christian worship, and outside the jurisdiction of the Church –
including “the wearing of the Surplice, the use of the Cross in Baptisme, the Ring in
Marriage and Sett forms of Prayer; or any Ceremony’s that are not absolutely in
themselves sinfull.”225
Importantly, it was precisely these embodied religious practices that grounded Tudor
and Stuart claims to royal supremacy over the Church, and which were most fiercely
contested between conformists to and dissenters from the Church of England. The 1533
Act of Restraint in Appeals legally established the independence of the Church of
England from the Roman Catholic Church, and codified the English monarch’s
jurisdiction over matters of Christian worship in England. As Walter Ullmann has argued,
Henry VIII’s ideological and legal claims to sovereignty were adapted from the Roman
imperial model, assuming “the sum-total of all the rights and functions which the late
Roman emperor had, hence was rex who in his kingdom was imperator."226 This is not to
imply that the Tudors harboured any universalist ambitions, but rather that Henry VIII
sought to “play in his own kingdom the role and function of the late Roman emperor
which was abundantly documented in the easily available Roman law.”227 Accordingly,
the Tudor claim to ecclesiastical authority indigenized the Roman formula for imperial
power: that "Ius publicum in sacris, in sacerdotibus et in magistratibus consistit.”228
Imperial sovereignty, according to this conceptualization, did not involve an
extraterritorial political claim, but rather a claim to undivided authority within the bounds
of a given kingdom. In ecclesiastical matters, this bifurcated the legal authority over the
Church of England into two categories. The monarch’s authority extended to both the
governance of the church, and to the establishment of external, embodied practices of
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worship – called adiaphora, or ‘things indifferent,’ which were considered extraneous to
belief.229 This authority did not extend to sacerdotal, or priestly, functions: the Church
was solely responsible for administering the sacraments, ordaining priests, and
consecrating bishops.230
It is difficult to overstate the centrality of this legal formula to subsequent Tudor and
Stuart claims to royal supremacy over the Church of England; and more broadly, to
debates over the governance of the church and religious toleration for dissenters. 231 In
1559, the Henrician model of church governance was revived by the Act of Supremacy,
which confirmed Elizabeth I’s right to wield the powers which had been granted to her
father by the Acts of Appeals, Annates, and Submissions.232 Following the Restoration of
the monarchy in 1660, the Restoration church settlement once again established the
monarch’s jurisdiction over adiaphora and the governance of the church. In 1662, the Act
of Uniformity “ordered, firstly, that all clergy swear their ‘unfeigned assent and consent’”
to the use of the Book of Common Prayer, which had not been revised to address the
concerns of puritans.233 Once again, the monarch’s jurisdiction over external religious
practices became a flashpoint between religious conformists and dissenters. The “rites,
gestures, ceremonies, and vestments which had annoyed puritans since the 1560s were
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retained: kneeling to receive Communion, signing the cross in baptism, and wearing the
surplice would thus remain Restoration complaints.”234 As Jacqueline Rose has noted, the
Oath of Supremacy first legislated under Henry VIII in 1533 was not repealed until
1689.235
In this context, Finch’s decision to place ‘the use of the Cross in Baptisme, the Ring
in Marriage and Sett forms of Prayer’ outside of the church’s jurisdiction is not simply an
assortment of religious practices, but rather a direct intervention into an explosive debate
surrounding worship, religious freedom, and church government. Behind Finch’s bland
phrasing is a deliberate intention to eliminate the freedom of religious dissenters to
translate their convictions into practice. Because these ‘things indifferent,’ or adiaphora,
are excluded from the definition of ‘religion,’ there is no need to tolerate those who
conscientiously object to them. Indeed, Finch explicitly affirms that there is no liberty of
conscience in matters of religious practice. “Nothing therefore can be sufficiently cogent
to a Christian to breake of the Communion with the Church He is born a Member of, and
to become a Dissentor or Nonconformist (to avoid the odious names of Separatist &
Schismatick) But that He apprehends Himselfe out of the State of Salvation under The
Communion of such a Church.”236
This requirement is even stricter than it appears at first glance. Finch uses the term
‘apprehend’ in its strongest possible epistemological sense. It is not enough to simply
object to a given doctrine of the Church on conscientious grounds: rather, “receding from,
and forsaking a Church a Man is a Member of, requires two things.”237 A legitimate
dissenter must not only provide “powerfull Arguments, of High Probability at Least,” for
the sinfulness of a given doctrine: the doctrines of the church in question must actually be
“Damnable.”238 Paradoxically, by positing a version of Christianity stripped down to three
minimal propositions, Finch narrows the legitimate grounds for dissent so drastically that
the right to liberty of conscience is virtually meaningless.
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Indeed, on the basis on his epistemic minimalism, Finch argued that Christians
should default to religious conformity. As we have seen, Finch posited that human
knowledge was relative, in that it was subject to the inherent limitations of sensory
organs. Accordingly, there is little to adjudicate between the claims of the established
church and religious dissenters, and “they th[a]t conform to the Governm[en]t may be as
Conscientiously perswaded of [th]e Justnesse of what the Governm[en]t enjoyns, out of
an Inward Principle, as well as Dissentors of the Contrary.”239 In the absence of any
conclusive theological or epistemic evidence, he asserts that “the Conscience w[hi]ch is
for preserving what is according to Law, is caeteris paribus [all other things being equall]
most preferable, and in things indifferent alwayes so.”240
In fact, Finch goes so far as to make morality itself a creature of government.
Because “all Men have equal Authority in pronouncing anything Good or Reasonable,”
two conflicting “Edicts […] were candidates of Equall Pretensions to Good.”241 In order
to preserve the unity of sovereignty within a state, Finch asserts that moral disagreements
must be resolved by the government, which “steps in, and siding with one Party, make
one opinion Good and the other Bad by Law.”242
In short, imposition in things indifferent does not abrogate the liberty of conscience,
precisely because Finch has defined the Church so minimally. There is no legitimate
dissent from a church which restricts itself to the requirements of scripture and the
administration of the sacraments: and because those grounds explicitly exclude
adiaphora, or ‘things indifferent,’ conscientious objections over religious practices are
not protected by the liberty of conscience. 243 In other words, Finch’s ecclesiology is one
which simultaneously defends and delimits liberty. By simultaneously extending the
liberty of conscience as a ‘Humane Right,’ and defining the appropriate scope of
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conscience so narrowly as to make legitimate dissent virtually impossible, he ultimately
invests the monarch with extraordinarily broad ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
3.2.2 Toleration in practice: Jews, Muslims, and Christian non-conformists
This imperial ecclesiology is the driving force behind Finch’s recommendations for
religious toleration in practice: for Finch, the liberty of conscience, though a ‘Humane
Right,’ was secondary to the sovereignty of the civil monarch. Judaism and Islam, the
two other monotheistic religions which had ‘orespread almost all [th]e whole world,’
were not only to be tolerated, but might even be (admittedly imperfect) routes to
salvation. By contrast, dissenting Christian denominations, with the possible exception of
the Quakers, were intolerable threats to the sovereignty of the state. The unifying feature
between these recommendations is an ecclesiological question: if, in Finch’s estimation, a
given religious community claims ecclesiastic authority that threatens the unitary, and
unified, sovereignty of the state, then the ‘Humane Right’ to liberty of conscience must
be abrogated.
Finch was far from immune to contemporary prejudices regarding Jews and
Muslims. In his 1674/5 report for Conway, for instance, he asserts that “The fourth Great
Point that tends to Enlargement of Empire is the Liberty of Every Mans having 4 Wives;
and as many Concubines as He Can maintain.”244 Indeed, in his estimation, the majority
of Christian conversions to Islam could be explained by concupiscence – which, he
observed with anticlerical relish, was a particular affliction of “Fryers & Ecclesiasticall
Persons.”245 Finch’s interest in Muslim sexuality and gender relations is quintessentially
orientalist, although unlike many of his peers, he saw Ottoman gender relations as a
model worth replicating, rather than evidence of his own superior self-mastery.246 Both
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Finch and Baines also traffic in Jewish stereotyping, although they refer to Jews far less
frequently than Muslims. In a letter dated May 25, 1674, for instance, Baines informed
Conway of Finch’s skillful negotiations with “[th]e faithlesse Greeke & false Jew.”247
At the same time, both men appear to have personally interacted with Ottoman
subjects on a basis of mutual respect. As the ambassador from an important trading
partner, Finch belonged to and socialized with the Ottoman social elite: as John-Paul
Ghobrial has noted, “the identities that mattered most in Istanbul were not always those
prescribed by Ottoman law – musta’min/subject, Christian/Muslim – but rather the social
distinctions that marked elites off from everyone else.”248 In the course of his
ambassadorial duties, Finch was an invited guest at high-level court functions.249 In
1676/1087, for instance, Finch traveled to Edirne (Adrianople) to attend the circumcision
celebrations for the sultan’s eldest son, later Mustafa II (r.1693-1703/981-1004). John
Coke, the Levant Company’s secretary in Istanbul, accompanied Finch, and published an
account of the celebrations later that year. Coke was keen to inform the English reading
public that they were well-served by Finch’s diplomatic efforts, writing that “To our own
private Affairs his Excellency my Lord Ambassador Sir John Finch had all
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satisfaction.”250 This example nicely illustrates the importance of Finch’s membership in
the Ottoman social elite to his overall diplomatic project, both materially and rhetorically:
publicly performing his social status facilitated his relationships with ranking Ottoman
bureaucrats, and communicated his (and the Company’s) importance to the English
public.
Finch clearly respected many of the Ottoman officials whom he encountered in the
course of his mercantile and ambassadorial duties. In 1674/5, for instance, he informed
his sister Anne that one “Chusain Aga’,” an official responsible for customs collections in
Istanbul, was “the most Subtile manager of his charge that has been [th]e Memory of
man; & I could wish our Merch[a]nts did not find it so.”251 He was also impressed by the
novelty of socializing without alcohol, and wrote that the “whole Discourse of the People
is Grave, Sedate, and without Heat; their words are slow the People being thoughtful;
attributing the haste and Heat of Speaking usd’ by most Christians to their being at the
best not quite Sober.”252 Finally, there is evidence that he and Baines were interested in
religious dialogue with Muslims, and were open to genuinely learning from those
encounters. John Covel’s diary records a theological disputation between Baines and
Vānī Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1684/1094), an influential and charismatic Qāḍīzādeli
preacher,253 during which the two spoke about Islamic thought, particularly the nature of
the soul, the status of women, and religious toleration.254
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In short, the manuscript record does not support any definitive statement regarding
Finch’s personal attitudes towards non-Christians. It seems most likely that he and Baines
internalized broad cultural stereotypes, but engaged in respectful professional and social
relationships with individual Muslims, in the context of the Ottoman social elite. In his
political and theological thought, however, Finch is far less opaque: religious toleration
should be extended to both Jews and Muslims. His most sophisticated argument for
tolerating non-Christians is articulated in his treatise manuscript, and relies upon a
conceptual distinction between ‘hearers’ – those who deliberately reject Christianity –
and ‘non-hearers.’ ‘Non-hearers,’ who had never been exposed to Christianity, could
nevertheless enjoy salvation if they “Livd’ with th[a]t measure of light they had originally
Implanted in them.”255 It is for that reason, he argues, that “Enoch, Noah, Abraham, &
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Job […] were righteo[u]s before the Law & before Christ,” along with virtuous classical
philosophers.256
Provocatively, Finch proceeds to compare contemporary “Jews, Turkes, & Pagans”
to these righteous ‘non-hearers.’257 On a fundamental level, he argues, education and
upbringing inevitably shape the epistemic context of an adult believer. “Now how near to
the Condition of Non Hearers approach, those th[a]t are Hearers, but under the Prejudice
of Education, or other Prevalent Circumstances repugnant to the Doctrine of Christ, as
Jews, Turkes, & Pagans.”258 Rhetorically, Finch distances himself from the full
theological implication of this argument. He quickly asserts that “no Name under heaven
is given by w[hi]ch Men can be savd’ but that of Jesus Christ,” and frames the argument
as an open question.259 Taken to its logical conclusion, however, his suggestion is that
‘Jews, Turkes, & Pagans’ are ontologically equivalent to virtuous ‘non-hearers,’ and are
therefore eligible for salvation.
It is possible that Finch was even more theologically sympathetic to Judaism and
Islam in private. Among his uncalendared papers is an undated document in his hand,
titled ‘How farr Humane Reason is exercisd’ in matters of Religion.’260 The document,
which occupies 11 folio sheets, appears to be a preliminary draft of material that was later
included in his much longer treatise manuscript.261 Remarkably, in a section on the early
history of the Church, he claims that “the Great Religions w[hi]ch have now orespread
almost all [th]e whole world though repugnant to each other the Jewish, Christian, &
Mahumetan Professions, doe not-withstanding all three agree the old Testament is [th]e
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Word of God, w[hi]ch nothing but Truth could Extract Out of the mouths of declard’
adversaries in Religion.”262
Nevertheless, Finch’s proposed toleration for Jews and Muslims is grounded in a
pragmatic, ecclesiological calculation, not a principle of mutual regard. Finch is
unambiguous that “Jewes, Turkes, & Pagans” should be “Indulgd’ Toleration,” which is
not a formula which appears anywhere else in his political writing.263 In this context, the
term ‘indulgence’ is used in a technical sense, referring to a particular legal instrument.
Under English law, only an Act of Parliament could fully rescind statutory law; however,
it was the monarch’s legal prerogative to personally excuse “individuals from the effects
of statutes, or to suspend statutes universally.”264 This unilateral legal instrument was
referred to as either a ‘declaration of indulgence’ or the monarch’s ‘dispensing power.’ In
the context of religious toleration, this prerogative was the king’s “main means to exempt
nonconformists from the obligation of religious uniformity.”265 Paradoxically, this power
meant that, in the face of a staunchly Anglican Parliament, late seventeenth-century
Puritans, Catholics, and other religious non-conformists often staked their hopes for
toleration on the indulgence of the monarch, and advocated strongly for the royal
supremacy.266 In 1662 and 1672, Charles II issued Declarations of Indulgence in an
attempt to “comfort peaceable Dissenters” from the Church of England, both of which
failed in the midst of bitter jurisdictional battles between the crown and Parliament.267
Accordingly, Finch’s proposal to ‘indulge’ toleration for Jews and Muslims has
political, legal, and ecclesiastical significance. Politically, it reflects his staunch royalism,
and his support for the monarch’s supremacy over the Church of England. Indeed, as the
Attorney General from 1670-3, Finch’s brother, Heneage Finch (1621-82)268, was
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responsible for defending Charles II’s second attempt to use indulgence to lift penal
sanctions from religious dissenters. Although Charles ultimately withdrew the 1672
Declaration, Heneage Finch “argued that Charles’s ecclesiastical headship meant that
changes to religion and canons needed statutory authority, but insisted kings could
dispense particular individuals.”269
Legally, it indicates that Finch did not propose toleration per se for Jews and
Muslims. Rather than repealing the statutory restrictions places on both groups, his
proposed strategy mirrors his brother Heneage’s argument for indulgence: that the
statutory intolerance of Jews and Muslims would be suspended by the monarch’s
unilateral declaration. In fact, that was exactly the legal status of the Jewish population in
England during the 1670s. Having been forcibly expelled from England in 1290, Jews
were first readmitted during the 1650s by Oliver Cromwell, who used “personal
prerogative powers to allow private but not public worship.”270 This indulgence was
extended by his monarchical successors, and by 1677, the Jewish community in England
had grown to approximately 500 people.271
Ecclesiastically, Finch’s defense of indulgence as a legal instrument indicates that his
proposed toleration would extend to Jews and Muslims on an individual, not a
communitarian basis. This is particularly significant with relation to Muslims. Early
modern travel writers repeatedly echoed the idea that Muslims were subject to a
transnational religious authority. In A Voyage into the Levant (1636), Henry Blount wrote
that “All these Sects [of Muslims] are governed by one Head, called the Mufty, whose
authority unites, and orders them […] This Mufty is created by the Emperour, to whom
he is held ever subordinate.”272 Conceptually, many English writers equated the “mufti in
Constantinople” with the Roman Catholic Pope, whose claims to universal jurisdiction
were seen as an intolerable attempt to subvert the monarchy.273 For this reason, it is
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ecclesiologicaly significant that Finch calls for the indulgence of Muslims on an
individual basis: by doing so, he intentionally sidesteps the potential for a conflict
between the jurisdictional claims made by ‘the mufti’ and the English state. Certainly,
Finch is relying on some nimble legal argumentation – but at least conceptually,
‘indulging’ rather than ‘tolerating’ Muslims allows him to simultaneously defend their
right to liberty of conscience, while preserving the state’s unitary sovereignty.
By contrast, Finch’s discussions of non-conforming and dissenting Christian
denominations are largely hostile to the possibility of toleration. Whereas Jews and
Muslims do in fact merit religious toleration, in the form of the monarch’s indulgence,
Finch subjects dissenting Christian sects to aggressive state intervention.
Finch’s attitudes towards Roman Catholics, in particular, are a mixture of personal
sympathies and ecclesiological hostility. As noted previously, the Finch family was
firmly Tory and High Anglican. Liturgically, Finch was committed to a catholic and
sacramental form of worship, and defended the use of vestments during the Eucharist, the
sign of the cross in baptism, the use of rings in the marriage liturgy, and the use of “Sett
forms of Prayers,” i.e., the Book of Common Prayer.274 At the same time, he and Baines
were opposed to the use of religious iconography in worship.275
Having lived in Italy almost uninterrupted for twenty years, from 1651-1671, Finch
and Baines were comfortable with Roman Catholics on both a personal and professional
level. Both men held university appointments in Italy, and as a member of the Accademia
del Cimento, Finch benefited from the personal patronage of Leopoldo de’Medici. And,
although the European diplomatic community in Istanbul was a close-knit social world,
the two men clearly enjoyed socializing (and sparring) with Catholic diplomats and
clerics.276 In his treatise manuscript, Finch records an anecdote from a dinner party with
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several members of a Catholic chivalric order, who had sworn a “Vow of perpetuall
Enmity with [th]e Turkes.”277 In response, Baines “pleasantly asked them” whether or not
they were familiar with the Lord’s Prayer, then gleefully “wondrd’ they could desire God
to forgive them their Trespasses, […] when they have made a solemn vow against
forgiving their Enemy’s, Contrary to the Doctrine of Christ.”278 Furthermore, both Finch
and Baines largely eschew anti-Catholic rhetoric. Both men thought that sectarian
prejudices were grounded in economic and jurisdictional anxiety, not in theological
controversy. As Baines wrote in 1676, “the Great Opposition which is made in England
against Catholicks, is not made by the greatest part of Men simply upon the Score of
Religion, but Upon the Score of Civill Rights.”279
Nevertheless, Finch was unambiguous that the Roman Catholic Church could not be
tolerated within England. His reservations are not liturgical or polemical, but strictly
ecclesiological: the Catholic popes, he argued, had over-extended their rightful
jurisdiction in three crucial ways. The first was temporal. In order to “oblige the
Consciences of all Men as well as Princes,” the popes had claimed the right to “not onely
of forgiving Sinnes upon Earth, but of making that w[hi]ch was no Sinne to become a
Sinne.”280 By doing so, the pope had claimed an authority “beyond that w[hi]ch the Sonne
of God Himselfe Exercisd’.”281 Ecclesiologically, Finch claimed, this fundamentally
threatened the sovereignty of the state, and “dissolvd […] [th]e most Solemn & Legall
obligations th[a]t Ever can happen between Prince & Prince, & Prince & People.”282
Secondly, according to Finch, the Roman Catholic Church overstepped its legal
privileges by claiming universal jurisdiction over all Christians after the fall of the
Roman empire. As the head of the imperial Roman church, he argued, the “Patriarch or
ArchB[isho]p of Rome” had exercised “as Universall a Dominion in Spiritualls, as the
Empire Excersisd’ in Temporalls, Rome being the Seat of both Jurisdictions.”283
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However, this universal jurisdiction was not “derivd’ from St Peter,” but was rather a
function of “[th]e dignity of Rome w[hi]ch was the Imperiall Seat of So Vast an
Empire.”284 Following the collapse of the Roman Empire, then, the universal jurisdiction
of the Roman Catholic Church was likewise devolved to the leaders of the national
churches.285
Finch’s final argument is a logical extension of the first two, which delimit the
temporal and spatial authority of the Roman Catholic Church. Tolerating the
jurisdictional claims of the popes would fundamentally undermine the sovereignty of the
government. “For God having made People for Governm[en]t, Every Governm[en]t must
be within itselfe Supreame as to all Interests & Purposes; Since the Governm[en]t would
be Lame & Defective if it depended in anything upon any Person out of its Territory or
Jurisdiction either. […] And This very Consideration is enough to Exclude out of all
Christian Commonwealths the Popes Supremacy, or indeed His Concerning Himselfe
with what related to any Thing Acted in ye state of another Prince, under the Pretense of
being Guardian Generall of Christianity.”286 For Finch, sovereign power in a given
jurisdiction must be vested in a single authority. In the context of the Roman empire, the
imperial church had been fully integrated into a single, universal polity; in a post-imperial
context, however, acceptance of the papal claim to universal jurisdiction amounted to
sedition.
In sum, Finch was virtually uninterested in anti-Catholic rhetoric; lived in Catholic
Italy for most of his adult life; and was personally inclined to a recognizably catholic
form of worship. His unwillingness to tolerate Catholicism is purely a matter of
jurisdiction. When we turn to his writing on dissenting Protestant sects, we find that he
oscillates between relative openness and almost complete hostility. For Finch, the
determining factor hinged on an ecclesiological question: if a given sect threatened the
unitary, and unified, authority of the state, then it had no right to liberty of conscience.
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Finch’s attitudes towards Quakers are consistent with this focus on ecclesiology and
the authority of the state. He was cautiously sympathetic to Quakers, insofar as he was
skeptical that they claimed independent ecclesiological authority. His most substantial
engagement with Quakerism was an epistolary exchange with Anne Conway in 1678.
Before her death in 1679 – likely sometime between 1677-8 –Anne scandalised her
family by converting to Quakerism, after a long process of exploration and dialogue with
prominent Quaker thinkers.287 Finch learned about her conversion on November 4, 1678,
when he received a letter forwarded from Henry More, and wrote to Anne himself four
days later.288 His reaction to the news is difficult to parse: the tone of the letter is both
disapproving and deeply affectionate. Nevertheless, he does not directly condemn her
decision, and unlike her husband Edward, does not claim to be personally embarrassed.289
He describes the Quakers as “well-meaning though mistaken,” and respects her
preferences by addressing her as ‘thee/thou.’290
This mitigated openness towards Anne’s conversion, and towards the sect at large,
proceeded from Finch’s admittedly rudimentary understanding of Quaker ecclesiology.291
It is significant that his letter stresses the importance of the royal supremacy: “In Short
my Dear Christs Kingdome being a Spirituall and not a Temporall One, For He came not
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to dethrone Kings, but Personally Obeyd’ Them and payd them their duty’s.”292 Finch
articulated this perspective more clearly in the notes for his treatise. Among his
uncalendared notes is an untitled document, dated June 10/20, 1678, in which he
discusses Quakerism at some length. Although he does not directly call for their
toleration, he offers two defenses against their critics. First, he observes, “those Persons
w[hi]ch are decipherd’ and distinguishd’ by that name [Quakerism], doe & and believe
many things […] that the most rigid or orthodox or Conformists […] So that [th]e Saing a
thing to be to the Doctrine of [th]e Quakers or Quakerism does not therefore render it
evill.”293 Second, he argues that the Quakers pose little threat to the integrity of the state.
In language that recalls his argument against toleration for Catholics, Finch displays far
more concern with religious dissenters who assert an independent ecclesiastical authority.
“For if Ecclesiastickal Persons have any Power of Governm[en]t [tha]t tis not from the
Civill Power; then [th]e Civill Power has no right to invade it or oppose it […] Now is
not this setting up direct Rebellion & Worse then Quakerisme, for those deluded People
pretend no thing as I rememb[e]r (who am little Consonant with their Reasons or
Doctrine) of Authority Independent of [th]e Governm[en]t.”294 Judging from these earlier
notes, while not quite prepared to call for their toleration, Finch was reasonably confident
that Quakers did not claim ecclesiological independence from the state. While
theologically misguided, they posed no immediate threat to the state’s unitary
sovereignty.
When religious dissenters threaten the unified and unitary sovereignty of the state,
however, Finch is clear that the principle of toleration must be abrogated. He was
certainly sympathetic to the plight of religious dissenters, noting that “every Man is
bound up to the Inward Law of what His Conscience or Perswasion enjoyns Him as
Good; yet the Peace of the Governm[en]t is of more Concern to the rest of Mankind, then
the Peace of any one Private Mans Conscience.”295 Furthermore, the sovereignty and
‘Peace of the Governm[en]t’ was not solely a matter of statecraft: it was explicitly
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ordained by God, and obedience to the state had a sacred dimension. Because God had
“Left Men in Government (w[hi]ch is of absolute necessity to Civill Society, and could
no subsist if all Mens Assertions and actings upon them were of equall Validity &
Authority) to such Declarations and Constitutions, and Publick Sanctions, as to the
Governm[en]t seem most consonant to Truth; […] No Man without Sinne can Depart in
any Point He is satisfyd’ of [th]e Truth of.”296 Accordingly, he warns “Dissentors [to]
further consider, that Almighty God never designed Religion to destroy Government in
regard that Religion being for the good & advantage of Humane Nature, it supports the
Preservation of Men, as to their Individualls whose Good it is to be, w[hi]ch cannot be
done without Government.”297
Ultimately, Finch arranges Christian denominations along an ecclesiological
spectrum, from Roman Catholics, to Quakers, to dissenting Protestant sects. Both
Catholics and Protestant dissenters are beyond toleration, because both claim
ecclesiastical authority independent of the state. In the case of Roman Catholics, the
claim to universal papal authority represents an intolerable usurpation of sovereignty at a
supranational level, whereas dissenters pose a subnational threat by claiming
independence from the national church. For Finch, Quakers occupy an intermediate
category. As he himself admits, he was ‘little Consonant with their Reasons and
Doctrine,’ but was under the impression that Quakers did not stake a claim to ‘Authority
Independent of [th]e Governm[en]t.’ It is precisely because of that uncertainty that he
does not unambiguously call for either their toleration or suppression. In each case,
however, the deciding factor is his degree of certainty as to whether a given denomination
fails an ecclesiological test.

3.3 Conclusion
From one perspective, Finch’s political thought seems deeply paradoxical, if not openly
inconsistent. He viewed religious toleration as a pragmatic tool of statecraft, but also
defended it as a ‘Humane Right.’ He argued that Jews and Muslims should be tolerated,
in the form of monarchical indulgence, but denied religious freedom to the majority of
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Christian denominations. He argued passionately for the liberty of conscience, but
accorded the monarch extraordinary power over religious practice.
These paradoxes are resolved, however, by slightly refocusing our critical lens.
Finch’s overwhelming priorities are to precisely define the jurisdiction of the state, and to
eliminate any possible challenge to the monarch’s sovereignty. While the liberty of
conscience is a ‘Humane Right,’ that right belongs to individuals, not to communities.
Hence, any community which challenges the jurisdiction of the state is intolerable. Those
challenges, according to Finch, can take either of two forms: a supranational challenge to
the state’s authority, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, or a challenge to the
monarch’s jurisdiction over the form of worship, as in the case of Protestant dissenters.
At the same time, Finch’s understanding of church history and the history of Islam had
convinced him that religious oppression was a fatal political error.
Accordingly, for Finch, liberty and coercion were equally necessary tools of prudent
government. The ‘Humane’ and inviolable right to liberty of conscience defended
individual believers from the sort of authoritarian oppression which could provoke them
to civil unrest: at the same time, restricting that right to individual beliefs ensured that the
monarch could suppress communities and practices which might challenge his
sovereignty. As Thomas Baines wrote, “it requires a Great Art to place the Ballast and
Burthen [the people] carry so proportionably that the whole might Navigate the better;
And this Ballast or Burthen is no other then the Laws’ They Live Under.”298
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Conclusion: Orientalism and imperialism in Finch’s thought
I thinke If I flatter not myself that I have somewhat out of [th]e ordinary Road,
showed the Religion of Mahomet to be calculated out of Prudentiall Principles,
for growth & Encrease of its profession, & consequently for Grandeur of
Empire.299
John Finch to Edward Conway, Feb. 4/14, 1674/5
In 1968, Henry Horwitz published a short bulletin in Notes and Queries, that correctly
attributed the authorship of Finch’s treatise manuscript for the first time in nearly three
hundred years. Based on the paleographic and textual evidence, Horwitz concluded that
the document – which had previously been attributed to Finch’s nephew, Daniel Finch –
was in fact the treatise which Finch had alluded to, but which had been presumed lost.
“[I]t is hoped that this brief notice will at last bring Sir John's treatise to the attention of
those students of seventeenth-century thought who can undertake the task of assessing it,”
Horwitz concluded.300
While Finch has gradually been rediscovered by historians of philosophy,
particularly Sarah Hutton, this thesis is the first effort to seriously engage with his
political thought. As I have argued, Finch freely synthesized his understanding of
Ottoman history and politics, his epistemological skepticism, and a staunchly royalist
ecclesiology into a theory of sovereignty and statecraft which balanced liberty with
coercion, pragmatism with rights. In this short conclusion, I build upon my reading of
Finch to offer three arguments. First, I argue that Finch’s political philosophy is both a
theory of sovereignty – as we have previously discussed – and a theory of empire.
Although Finch did not explicitly call for foreign colonization, his orientation towards
empire is betrayed by his involvement with the Council for Plantations (see above, ch. 1),
and confirmed by the substance of his political writing. As Jennifer Pitts recently
observed, the “problem of managing difference is often seen as the perennial political
challenge for empires.”301 Finch himself admitted that his keen interest in Ottoman
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religious toleration was an effort to understand the ‘Prudentiall Principles’ which enabled
‘Grandeur of Empire.’
As a result, Finch offers manuscript evidence that at least some early modern
imperial thinkers looked to the Ottoman empire as a model. His political philosophy
combined comparative, Orientalist scholarship with an orientation towards empire: his
papers are, therefore, a first step in addressing an important gap in the existing scholarly
literature.
Finally, I argue that the role played by ecclesiology in Finch’s philosophy offers an
important conceptual tool for further inquiry. If Finch illustrates a gap in the existing
scholarship, then he also suggests a tool which can be used to ‘read for imperialism’ in
early modern Orientalist manuscripts and publications. Finch synthesized his
understanding of English and Ottoman politics and history by filtering both through a set
of ecclesiological questions regarding the church, the state, religious minorities, and
Christian dissenters. Understanding the role that ecclesiological thought played in his
scholarship offers a forensic tool: if a given Orientalist author frames his account of the
Ottoman empire using ecclesiological thinking, then it is worthwhile to ask whether he,
like Finch, is acting out of an orientation to empire.

4.1 A theorist of empire
As I have argued, Finch’s political philosophy is ultimately best characterized as a theory
of sovereignty. For Finch, the unitary authority of the monarch was paramount. Although
he offered a robust theory of religious toleration, grounded in epistemic skepticism, he
did not seek to liberate the individual from religious oppression. Instead, liberty and
coercion – toleration and oppression – are equally important tools of statecraft, and both
may be wielded by the government in order to uphold its sovereignty.
This is not a theory of empire in the sense that would be prevalent between the mideighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century. Finch did not “rank all non-European
cultures as ‘inferior’ or ‘lower’ from the point of view of the presumed direction of
European civilisation.”302 Rather, he explicitly sought to learn from and about the
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Ottoman model for empire, in order to apply it in his own context. He did not attempt to
“legitimate European imperialism” or colonialism.303 Having sat on the Council for
Plantations for two years, it is almost certain that Finch was interested in the idea of
colonial expansion, but his political theory is almost entirely concerned with domestic
policy. Neither is it quite accurate to say that Finch “imposed” his theory of empire “on
non-European peoples as their cultural self-understanding.”304
Rather, this is a theory of empire which bridges the gap between the legal concept of
imperium, which the English had inherited from Roman law, and the articulations of
imperialism which would emerge later in the eighteenth century. As discussed previously,
the concept of imperium was introduced in England by Henry VIII, who sought to
combine territorial sovereignty, in defiance of the Catholic Church’s supranational
authority, with the Roman emperor’s imperial powers – the administration of cultic
objects, control of the civil service, and supremacy over the church.
Based on his understanding of ecclesiastical history and the early history of Islam,
Finch was convinced that empires rose and fell according to their ability to unite civil and
ecclesiastical power. As he observed in his treatise, “the first Splitting of the Roman
Eagle, was not the dividing it into the Spreaded Powers of the Eastern & Western
Empires, but that w[hi]ch made it become a true Spread Eagle was this dividing Rule &
Governm[en]t into Spirituall & Temporall; as to the Exercise of Punishm[en]t & reward
under different names of Power w[hi]ch before were streams arose from ye same fountain
[…].”305 His political project, then, was an effort to fuse the two heads of the Roman
imperial eagle, by reuniting ‘Spirituall & Temporall’ power under the unitary authority of
the English monarch.
Crucially, Finch thought that the Ottoman sultans had already accomplished this feat.
For the Ottoman dynasty, which did not claim descent from Muhammad, the conquest of
Istanbul in 1453/856 was an important element of imperial rhetoric and ideology.
Subsequently, the Ottoman imperial ideology was strongly influenced by their self-
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conception and presentation as the successors to the Roman empire. In 1538/944, for
example, Süleyman I claimed sovereignty over the historical Roman empire, boasting
that “In Baghdad I am Shah, in Rum Caesar, in Egypt Sultan, who sends his fleets to the
seas of Europe, the Maghrib and India.”306
Finch was not only familiar with this claim, but saw the Ottoman empire as an
improvement upon the Roman – precisely because of the relationship between Islam and
the Ottoman porte. In 1674/5, he wrote that the
Civill Law of the Government is so twisted with the Ecclesiasticall; That the very
basis of the Governm[en]t is built upon the reverence to the Law; […] Mahomet
like a wise Prince being the Lawgiver, having Learnd’ from the vexations and
troubles the Emperours mett with from the exorbitant assuming of Jurisdiction of
the Patriarchs of Constantinople and the Popes in Rome; to fit the Ecclesiasticall
part of the Governm[en]t to a perfect dependence upon the Secular in the Person
of the Prince.307
The Ottomans, in other words, had successfully reunited the ‘two eagles’ of Roman
imperium. Finch’s comparative analysis of Ottoman history and politics was far from a
dispassionate scholarly project: it was an overt attempt to understand the religious basis
of their imperial success, and to translate his analysis into the language of contemporary
English politics.
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4.2 Early modern imperialism: Overlooking Orientalism
In the introduction to this thesis, I gestured towards a gap in the existing literature on the
history of scholarship, and its relationship to empire. As I argued, there is a vibrant and
important literature focused on the nineteenth century that investigates the relationship
between comparative religious scholarship and European imperialism, and between
Orientalist scholarship and imperialism. Conversely, while early modernists have
engaged (albeit fitfully) with early modern comparative religious scholars and
Orientalists, they have not done so in relation to early modern concepts of empire. This
thesis begins to address that gap. Finch was keenly interested in comparing and
synthesizing Ottoman and English politics and religious history, precisely in order to
learn from the Ottoman imperial model, and to apply it to the English context.
In my view, Finch’s interest in learning from the Ottomans illustrates one of the
reasons that intellectual historians have overlooked the relationships between early
modern Orientalists and empire. Edward Said’s critique of orientalism remains an
indispensable tool for identifying the imperial project underlying much of European
scholarly engagement with Islam. However, in his wake, it has become natural to think
that European scholars and writers interested in the Ottoman empire were always already
motivated by an urge to exoticize, to ‘other,’ and to dominate. As we have seen, Finch’s
thought and sensibilities are far from postmodern and postcolonial. However, his interest
in Ottoman politics is not orientalist in the sense that Said articulated – from his vantage
point in the 1670s, seeking to subvert or to dominate the Ottoman empire would have
appeared ludicrous.308 Indeed, especially considering his role as a diplomat and a source
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of intelligence for the English state, his lack of interest in identifying or exploiting any
political weaknesses in the Ottoman Empire is striking.309 Instead, by analyzing the
religious basis for the “Greatnesse of this Empire,” he sought to chart a course to empire
for the English state.310
In other words, while Finch sought to develop a body of knowledge about religion
and politics in the Ottoman Empire, he did not do so with the intention of dominating or
subverting the Ottomans. Rather, as an ambassador to the most successful empire in
Eurasia, he sought to learn the mechanics of empire from the Ottomans, in order to adapt
and apply them to the English context. Those mechanics, as we have seen, involved
placing a heavy burden of government upon English subjects, religious communities, and
the established church. Put differently, Finch’s imperialism is domestic, not imperial; his
empire regulated the English themselves, not a colonial ‘other.’ To identify Finch as an
imperial thinker, we must learn to invert the ideological orientation absorbed from Said:
in Finch, we find an example of an early modern Orientalist who was interested in
learning from the Ottomans, and for whom empire was a domestic project.
As a case study, however, Finch also challenges a second body of historical
literature. Within the past two decades, early modernists have begun to investigate the
history of European imperial ideology; almost invariably, however, the literature has
focused on early modern imperial theorists in the context of the Renaissance and the
legacy of Roman law and ideology. According to Anthony Pagden, “the theoretical roots
of the modern European overseas empires reached back into the empires of the Ancient
World. It was, above all, Rome which provided the ideologues of the colonial systems of
give way to an emergent imperiousness” (Gerald MacLean, Looking East: English Writing and the
Ottoman Empire before 1800 [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007], 20–22).
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Spain, Britain, and France with the language and political models they required.”311
David Armitage has argued that an integrated concept of the British Empire, as
“Protestant, commercial, maritime and free” was only possible by the 1730s.312 One of
the most important conceptual challenges to modern imperialism was inherited from
Machiavelli’s analysis of the Roman empire. “For the classical - above all, Roman historical and moral traditions within which the majority of early-modern British theorists
had been educated, libertas and imperium remained seemingly incompatible values. […]
So widespread was knowledge of classical history, among the generally educated as well
as the more technically learned, that the problem of how to achieve empire while
sustaining liberty became a defining concern of British imperial ideology from the late
sixteenth century onwards.”313 English imperial thinkers only resolved the classical
tension between empire and liberty by equating empire with commerce, and commerce
with freedom.314 Thomas Dandelet has called attention to the centrality of the European
Renaissance to the (re)emergence of imperial thought in early modernity. In his view,
empire was an intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, political, and ideological project, that
drew inspiration from the texts and physical artifacts of ancient Rome.315 London, Paris,
and Madrid were “numerous new Romes all vying for the imperial mantle and all
claiming to be the rightful successor to ancient Roman glory.”316 In England, Roman law
and rhetoric held incredible attraction. As we discussed earlier, Henrician imperium was
adapted from the Constantian model, which ascribed ecclesiological sovereignty to the
emperor. This legal concept would be even more forcefully re-articulated for his son,
Edward VI, by a German theologian named Martin Bucer. Writing in 1551, Bucer turned
to “the Byzantine church of Constantine and Justinian [for an] historical precedent that
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allowed for a dominant monarchical role vis-à-vis the Church”; Bucer’s work in turn
influenced other, better-known writers, notably John Jewel.317
These studies, while ground-breaking, have yet to investigate how or whether early
modern European theorists of empire were impacted by either Islamic thought or the
Ottoman imperial model.318 As a case study, John Finch’s extant papers challenge this
silence. He not only analyzed the religious roots of Ottoman imperial success: he adapted
that model to the English context, and explicitly called upon his correspondents to
implement it.

4.3 Reading for imperialism: Ecclesiology and Orientalism
In short, Finch is evidence that at least some early modern Orientalists were motivated by
an orientation to empire: and that at least some early modern theorists of empire sought
information about Muslim models of imperialism. His example also suggests a potential
hermeneutic for identifying others who did the same.
Recently, early modern historians have begun to re-evaluate the relationship between
religion and the Enlightenment; or more precisely, between religious discourse and the
languages of early modern political thought. As Justin Champion has noted, in
“partnership with John Pocock” and other historians working in the ‘Cambridge school’
of intellectual history, “we now have accounts of the plural languages of political thought
in the [early modern] period – jurisprudential, common law, historical – but despite this
pluralism of discourse the historiography has almost entirely ignored the religious
context.”319 To reconstruct and recover the political discourse of the seventeenth century,
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I would argue that we must add ecclesiological thought to this list. At minimum, we must
recognize that, for early modern thinkers, ecclesiological discourse was not ‘confined’ to
theological debates: those theological debates were political in and of themselves.320
By extension, writing in terms of ecclesiology was one discursive tool through which
an early modern author could intervene in contemporary political questions, or gain
purchase on political debate. In Finch’s case, we find an example of an author who
sought to synthesize Ottoman politics and history with the history of the early church, in
order to address contemporary political concerns. Crucially, his most pressing concerns
involve the relationships between an established church, religious dissenters, and the state
– these are fundamentally ecclesiological questions, or to employ a slight anachronism,
questions about ‘church and state.’ To extrapolate from Finch’s example, then, when
trying to determine whether an Orientalist text or author might be relevant to the
emergence of European imperial thought, a useful hermeneutic might be to ask whether
or not the text is framed in terms of ecclesiological discourse or questions.321

4.4 Conclusion
As William Bulman has argued, while “the intimate relationship between the
Enlightenment and the modern European empires has become an almost hoary truth, it is
crucial to understand that in England, at least, this relationship was present from the
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the Manners, Religion and Government of the Turks, EEBO (London : Printed for Moses Pitt, 1678., 1678);
Paul Rycaut Sir, The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire, EEBO (London : Printed by T.N.
for Joanna Brome, 1682., 1682); Addison, The First State of Mahumedism.
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beginning.”322 Although broadly applicable to Finch’s manuscripts, I would suggest that
this ‘hoary truth’ must be considered afresh in his case. Finch’s methods and
preoccupations were undoubtedly orientalist; by framing his account of the Ottoman
empire through an ecclesiological lens, however, he intended to provide his readers with
a blueprint for an English empire. Drawing on Ottoman politics, the early history of Islam
and the Christian church, and a skeptical epistemology, he synthesized a theory of
sovereignty that obliges us to reconsider the relationship between early modern
Orientalism and the history of European imperial thought.
Finch never published during his lifetime, and his surviving papers only exist in
manuscript form. As a result, besides Thomas Baines, the only known audience for his
views on empire are his sister, Anne Conway, and his brother-in-law, Edward Conway, to
whom both men wrote at length on statecraft, empire, and Islam. It seems fitting to
conclude with Baines’ last known letter, written to Conway in 1681. Earlier that year,
Conway had been appointed the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, a post he
would only occupy for two years. On May 11/21, Baines wrote to congratulate (and to
flatter) him:
And Therefore I will be a Prophett & Say That your Lord[shi]p will not be fixd’
in this place, but will rise Higher in His Ma[jes]ty’s Grace & Favour.
His Ego nee metas rerum nee termpora pono
Imperium sine fine dedi.323
Making good use of his classical education, the quotation is from Virgil’s Aeneid, and is
spoken by Jupiter: “For these, I set no limits in space and time; I give them empire
without end.”

William Bulman, “Enlightenment and Religious Politics in Restoration England: Enlightenment and
Religious Politics,” History Compass 10 (2012): 61.
323
LRO Finch MS, Baines to Conway, May 11/21, 1681, cal. HMC Finch vol. II, p. 111, f. 2.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Finch in context
The following schematic outlines Finch’s family relations, and his personal connections
to better-known figures – Henry Stubbe, Anne Conway, and Henry More.

Heneage Finch (1580-1631)
Recorder of London

Frances Bell (d. 1627)
Elizabeth Bennet (d. 1661)

Heneage Finch (1621-82)
First earl of Nottingham
Lord Chancellor, 1675-82

John Finch (1626-82)
Ambassador to Ottoman
Empire, 1674-81
Quoted Stubbe
extensively in letters
to Conway

Left his papers/
library to

Daniel Finch (1647-1730)
Second earl of Nottingham
Secretary of state, 1689-93

Educated by

Henry Stubbe (1632-76)
Wrote Originall and
Progress of
Mohametanism (1671)

Henry More (1614-1687)

Introduced Finch to
Thomas Baines (1624-80)
Doctor and anatomist; Finch’s
partner from 1655

Edward Conway (1623-83)
Secretary of State for Northern
Department, 1681-3

Treated in late
1660s

Anne Conway, née Finch (1631-79)
Correspondent with Henry More;
notable neo-Platonist
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Appendix B: Table of Contents for John Finch’s treatise
The following chart outlines the contents of John Finch's treatise manuscript. Composed
between 1675-81, the manuscript is currently archived in the Record Office for
Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland (LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9).
This table of contents follows Finch’s highly regimented structure, which subdivides the
manuscript into books, chapters, and sections. I have provided a brief description of the
contents of each section.
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Appendix C: John Finch to Edward Conway, 1674/5
<76r>

Pera of Constantinople Feb 4/14: 1674/5

My ever most honoured & Dear Lord324
Tis so long since I have given the least interruption to yo[u]r Lo[r]d[shi]ps thoughts, and
enjoyments: that I know not how to breake in upon them, w[hi]ch are entertain’d with so
many pleasing objects in the advancements of your best friends to the most advantageous
stations in England; without begging your Lo[r]d[shi]ps pardon: w[hi]ch though the
wonted goodnesse your Lo[rdshi]p exercisd’ towards me gives me some assurance of; yet
knowing that the constant conversing with the same though neverso delightfull
Reppresentations; must at length sate, if not cloy the faculties of the mind; The nature of
beings gives me security of. For now I can easily imagine that if nothing else in my
writing is agreeable to your Lo[rdshi]p at least the variety of conversing with so remote a
Person, and Different objects, will serve for your divertissement.
My Lord I never understood the humour of those Men, who in their travels thinke
themselves obligd’ so soon as they are settled in their Lodgings to give an Account of the
Country: And this is a fault I cannot dispense withall; in our Modern writers of their
voyages, whose Itinerary’s are stuffd’ up with little more then mine Hosts tale, some
Language Master’s or Interpreter’s Story’s, and some Figures of Buildings, than could
not remove out of their way; w[hi]ch Superficiall Survey of Country’s and Regions,
though it be blamable, even when the vicinity of the Place and affinity of Customs can
easily afford us better grounded observations, is unpardonable, when the remotenesse of
the Country, and repugnant manners, give no Leave to perfect those weake and loose
notices that are given us. And I much fear My Lord that in <76v> the Desscriptions of the
Empire your Lo[rdshi]p is Conversant with, this defect is too obvious; the Pictures
making the greatest part of the Discourse; as if the Greatnesse of a Monarchy that is
grown bigg out of the Conquest of Christians, was founded in those petite differences of
habit w[hi]ch every mans eyes that does not shutt them cannot but animadvert. I shall
therefore endeavour to entertain your Lo[rdshi]p whose is a Person of businesse; with
some Account of this Empire in another Manner; Leaving the perfecting of those things
which are fitted to the brevity of a letter, to time and observation.
The Greatnesse of this Empire or rather that of Mahumedanisme, was layd in the infancy
of it by Mahomet; in opposition to Christianity upon w[hi]ch the Religion being to make
its advances; Quite Contrary to Christianity w[hi]ch is a Religion of Peace; The
foundation of Mahumedanisme is warr; It being enjoynd’ as a Precept to make war upon
The following is my transcription of John Finch’s 1674/5 report on the Ottoman empire for Edward
Conway, currently archived in the British Library (BL Add. MS 23215, ff. 76 r-82r). This transcription has
been published in accordance with Canadian copyright law; my thanks to Tom Adam, of the D.B. Weldon
Library at the University of Western Ontario, for clarifying the relevant regulations.
I have indicated folio breaks using angled brackets in bold. In all other respects, my transcription practices
are identical to those outlined in the ‘Abbreviations and Conventions’ section, above.
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all Persons that acknowledgd’ not the Alcoran or Submitted not to the Government of
them that believd’ it. This Religion beginning in the time of the Emperour Heraclites had
its rise in a time when it was fitted to make a suddain growth (and accordingly its
progresse in 30 years time reducing all Arabia Persia & Agypt was beyond the example
of all other Religions) For the seat of the Roman Empire being translated to
Constantinople, and the Eastern and Western Empire divided; The Interests quickly
became not the Same, they [tha]t wore [th]e Imperiall Crowns being not so; and
consequently [tha]t overproportiond power was renderd’ Lesse formidable being
divided: Besides the result of a desire in [th]e Western Emperour to see the Eastern so
concernd’ly engagd’ at Home, [tha]t He might not be at Leisure, to exercise superiority
over the Western Emperour; the Great Divisions in all Religions then under any name of
Profession; gave <77r> great advantages to the introducing of a new one. For Christian
Religion w[hi]ch was now flown in the beliefe and Generall Exercise of it as farr as the
Wings of the Roman Eagle could carry it; insomuch [tha]t it had very weake opposition
from Paganism; begun to Exercise greater cruelty upon itselfe, then all the Heathen
Persecutions amounted to. For with Constantine the Emperour came the Promulgation of
Two points that rent the outward profession of Christianity into incomposable disunion:
The first was the Heresy of Arrius w[hi]ch though by [tha]t Emperors diligence was
condemnd’ in the Councill of Nicea; yet that Generall Councill did rather kindle then
extinguish the flame, Whole Regions & Kingdoms as Spayn & all the Goths professing
Arrianisme; Nay Italy itselfe under the Popes immediate direction was so overspread with
it, That at Rimini Arrianisme was establishd’ by a Councill of Bishops; that were more in
number by above one hundred, then what were present at the Nicene Councill, and that
with so unanimous Suffrages; That there were not 15 who asserted the Doctrine Contrary
to Arrius as besides universall History, the Inscription set up by Cardinall Spada attests as
Catholica so calld’ because that little place Ten miles distant from Rimini, gave a
receptacle to those few orthodox who dissented. The point that next divided the
Christians was the Introduction of Images and their worship; by the Emperour Himselfe,
For Constantine was the First [tha]t ever made the Statue of our Saviour Christ, and
Helena his mother that of the Virgin Mary: w[hi]ch though to persons who had never
known any other worship then th[a]t of Images; upon their Entrance into Christianity &
directing by it their devotions; might to Proselytes in some measure be indulgd’; yet to
those who had long bin escaped out of the Heathen darkenesse; it looked like a retrograde
Passe towards Paganism; and whilst it invited some who were usd’ to adore Images, to
embrace the new Confession, <77v> it deterrd’ others from admitting those into their
Society & Communion, who admitted [th]e adoration of Images, the great theme so
advantageously to Christian Religion declaimd’ against by the Primitive Christians.
As to the Jewish Religion; Since the destruction of Hierusalem by Titus, and the utter
desolation of [th]e remaines of it &changing its name into Aelia Hadriana; and
banishment of the Jewes from thence by the Emperour Adrian. The poor miserable
remnants of [tha]t People became Citizens of the world; and shelterd’ themselves under
the name of Christians, for in the primitive times these two Religions agreeing in the
worship of one God and abhorring of Idols, were not easily distinguished and therefore

101
distinct from Christians, though were able to make a number, were not now able to make
a lead; & much Lesse when the Christian Religion became the Religion of the Roman
Empire; and very probably from the great Concourse of Jews to Agypt (for they have
ever had a mind to the Garlick & Onions of that place) great was the number of Judaizing
Christians in Alexandria and its Patriarchate, w[hi]ch makes us [th]e lesse wonder [tha]t
Arrius came from thence with a Doctrine so suitable to Judaism. But to return more
closely The Dispersion of the Jews renderd’ their religion more considerable for what it
had been; then was in [th]e opinion of men when the open Professors of it were not
known.
The Pagan Religion had bin by the Mosaicall writings and forms, long batterd’, but by
the Christian Religion wide Breaches were made in it, till the Emperours becomming
Christians the Walls were quite thrown down; and Pagan worship forbid by Publicke
Edicts; so [tha]t Paganisme being now discountenancd’ by the head the Emperour; was
not able to make any Head for its own defense; In this condition was the face of things as
to all Religions; and as to Governm[en]t Heraclitus ruled the East in person at
Constantinople, & Italy by His Exarchats325 at Ravenna. <78r> This Governm[en]t of
Italy by Hexarchs who resided at Ravenna as the Imperiall Seat; gave advantage to the
Longobards to plant a Kingdome in Lombardy w[hi]ch was of long duration inspight of
[th]e Roman Empire; & [th]e occasion of it was the non agreem[en]t of these Hexarchs of
the Emperour who resided in Constantinople with the Popes; by w[hi]ch means the power
of Rome was frequently Depressd’. And The two predecessors of Heraclitis, Mauritius &
Phocas had made Italy by their detestation of and ad hoering to [th]e Pope the Scene of
Suddain and contrary mutations w[hi]ch render all Governments dangerous. For the First
at a Councill held at Constantinople declard’ the Patriarch of Constantinople to be the
Universall Bishop or Oecumenicall Pastor, giving great disquiet to S. Gregory the Great
then Pope by His Hexarchs, & Longobar[ds] [tha]t Joynd’ with then; and He being
murdred by Phocus who Succeeded Him, was as well murdred by him in His Edicts,
Declaring upon appeal of Gregory the Great That the Pope was the Vicar of Christ &
Oecumenicall Pa[sto]r: By w[hi]ch so immediate and contrary Declarations All the
Eastern & Western Christians were torn asunder; and full of [th]e highest animosity’s
towards each other; Heraclitis followd’ [th]e Roman Interest to the great dissatisfaction of
[th]e Eastern Church; & being now weary with a Long warr against [th]e Persians gives
Himselfe to ease. And in this Conjuncture as to all Religions of the World; & the Roman
Empire; did Mahomet beginn to promulgate His Doctrine; w[hi]ch beginning to have
followers gott an Army to overrun Persia quickly, by the ill Conduct of Heraclitis, For the
Sarracens who were allways in the pay of the Empire; being ill payd’ & worse usd’ by the
Emperours officers they in a mutiny Revolted to Mahomet, who had fitted His
fundamentals to the Present Conjuncture of Affayrs Universally. And therefore sett up a
Religion That through neither Jew nor Christians could being so admitt of; yet it should
have Principles Suitable to both; and be fitted for Proselyts w[hi]ch could not possibly be
An idiosyncratic variant of “Hexarch,” the title given to the governors of the provinces in Italy and
Africa recovered by the Byzantine emperor Justinian I.
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other then reall by the Shibboleth He <78v> gave to buy them. These Points of Religion
were Principally four [tha]t were fitted to make an Empire great.
Their first and main Principle is That there is but one God; w[hi]ch in all their Prayers
(w[hi]ch they say five times a day in Publick) they repeat over and over; And Atheisme
or Polytheisme is amongst them Death without mercy; The repetition of the Doctrine of
one God in all their Prayers and Discourses, was that w[hi]ch brought over The Arrians to
them with ease; who denyd’ the Divinity of our Saviour, and they were very numerous in
all the Eastern parts at that time; and to Speake the Truth The very Doctrine of [th]e
Alcoran seems particularly to be Levelld’ against the Doctrine of [th]e Trinity and
Divinity of our Saviour; Mahomet repeating the Impossibility of God having Sonnes; and
yet calls our Saviour the Spirit of God, The Miraculous Holy one Borne of a Virgin; and
in every thing that relates to our Saviour speakes as honorably as Arrius, nay Further
enjoyns every Musselman to believe so of Him & Punish as a blasphemer anyone that
speak contumeliously of Him: This Doctrine of one God brought in all the Jews too,
whom to invite by nearer approaches, They retaind’ Circumcision; And frequent outward
washings for till they wash their Feet and their Arms they cannot say their Prayers; and
the Prohibition of Swines flesh.
Their second Great Principle is the Accounting Wine an Accursed thing; and forbidding
the Drinking of it as a horrid Sinne. This was a perfect opposition to Christians; who
celebrate the Sacram[en]t of the Lords Supper with Wine, & cannot if it be to be had
Celebrate without it, w[hi]ch putt Christians to a Shiboleth of being known by; as well as
the speaking magnificently of our Saviour was a Shiboleth to the Jews; and was [th]e
occasion of [th]e mistake in many writers who say that a Jew before He can Turn Turk
must first Turn Christian. But the Politick use of this Prohibition is of more use then the
Religious; For your Lp[rdshi]p who is so great a souldyer will <79r> presently conclude
That an Army w[hi]ch Drinkes nothing but water is not only with much more ease
provided for then one that drinks Wine & Beer; For water will be had with ease; when
those other Drinks cannot be gott, for want of w[hi]ch they [tha]t are usd’ to it presently
Languish. an advantage fitted for conquest. But To this must be added the Constant
Sobriety [tha]t attends them; w[hi]ch makes them not only in Military affayrs keep exact
discipline, and slip no occasion; w[hi]ch Drunkenesse in Christian Army’s makes them
wanting in: But in Civil Government makes the People of so calme & Pacific a Temper;
That [th]e whole Discourse of the People is Grave, Sedate, and without Heat; their words
are slow the People being thoughtful; attributing the haste and Heat of Speaking usd’ by
most Christians to their being at the best not quite Sober. True it is my Lord that the
Greatest Turkes violate this prohibition & once or twice a week drink Wine (And the
Court amongst Christians are not the most mortifyd’ men neither). But when the Turks
drink wine they doe it on purpose to be drunk, for water they will never putt to it And the
Quantity is always Great. The Gran Signor himselfe would one day in His Hunt entring a
Christian House needs taste wine w[hi]ch He smelt in the Poor Cottage; But His
Favourite [tha]t marry’s now His daughter durst not till He had acquainted the G. Visir
give Him any; And then [th]e Visir orderd’ wine to be given Him [tha]t was allmost
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vinegar w[hi]ch the G. Signor tasting wonderd at the Gusto of [th]e Christians: The Visir
feard’ the change of Inclinations in the G. Signor who being a most Mercifull and Sedate
Prince, He did not thinke it safe to putt unlimited power into humors never yet
experimentd.
The Third Great Principle is Liberty of Conscience to all different Religions that
acknowledge But one God; The Professors of it paying to the Gran Signor onely 15 s
p[er] Annum. As by the former Praecepts they were fitted for Conquests, so by this they
were not onely made easy, by making their yoke so (in that w[hi]ch men are the most
uneasy in) But by it, they were assurd’ to <79v> keep the Conquests they had made; for
nothing occasions such desperate Revolts and dangerous attempts as the oppressing [th]e
Conscience; w[hi]ch being a Trade so universally practisd’ amongst Christians; the Turks
find it a most beneficiall one to them; For all sides empty their coffers at this Court to
depresse those Christians that are of a different perswasion from them; And in the time of
the Christian Emperours The Eastern & Western Churches did never with more
bitternesse persecute each other; I cannot say Annually what they spend, but the
Christians are allotted at least 40 th[ousa]nd Crowns per annum to uphold their
Animositys. And at this very time the Greeke Church by mony has gott a sennenod
[synod?] to out the Latin Church of the possession of [th]e Holy Sepulchre; unlesse it be
only from midnight to break of day; w[hi]ch after a little time very likely they may with
much expense regayn.
The fourth Great Point that tends to Enlargement of Empire is the Liberty of Every Mans
having 4 Wives; and as many Concubines as He Can maintain. Tis true indeed My Lord
The Husband is obliged once a weeke to give due benevolence to his Wives or for want
of it The woman may goe to the Cadi & be divorced; nor can He without [tha]t
benevolence use any of His Concubines: But Desire of Women being the most Prevalent
because the most naturall & necessary Passion God has given Man; Tis very inviting to
make that a reward of a Beleif w[hi]ch Christians hold inconsistent with their beleif. And
upon this very Account most of the Renegado’s Turn Turks; especially Fryers &
Ecclesiasticall Persons; And Sawyer Himselfe our English Apostate made this liberty of
enjoying women without sinning, the Great Argument of his becoming Turk; and to
maintain Him when He was so, of cheating His Principalls; This Doctrine of Concubines
was exactly fitted to the Jewish Practise, and indeed to the Customs of all the Eastern
Great Persons in all ages; and servd for [th]e propagating Mahumadanism; The
Concubines being of any Religion for they are Generally Slaves; and their children
become all Turkes, and the Mothers if not before, yet after then have children are
seldome <80r> otherwise. But to speake of things as they are of all Religions The Turkish
provides the least for [tha]t of [th]e women: For though the Men are enjoynd’ to come
five times a day to say their Publick prayers in the Moscheas; yet the women are never
permitted to come to doe their devotions there; w[hi]ch I believe to be occasiond upon a
Treble Account, Each w[hi]ch depend upon one Generall one, w[hi]ch is the strange
Jealousy of all their women; For they never suffer them to speak to any man but their
own Husbands or Masters; unlesse Eunuchs [tha]t Guard them, nor to be seen by any
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man; For if at any time they come in view w[hi]ch is but seldome for they hardly give
them Leave to goe abroad; They are so muffled up that nothing of their face is to be seen
more then such a part of their eyes as must not be hid if they would have them see their
way; nor any part of their Skin save their hands, whose Extremity their sleeves (for they
never wear gloves) doe not cover & so their nayles and tips of their fingers may be
perceivd’ to be dyed red for [tha]t they all use. Now My Lord were women enjoynd or
permitted to come to church; so I call at present their Moscheas; In the first place they
would come abroad five times a day; Secondly their morning prayers being a little before
break of day; and their Two last times of prayer, at Sun Sett, & An hour & and a half
after sun sett, the Womens dayly comming abroad, would at such hours of Convenience
for appointments enrage the Turkish Jealousy; But in [th]e third place if they should
come to Publick devotion, since they could not be admitted to prayers unlesse they first
washed their Armes and Feet, they must expose to dayly & Publicke view of men; what
they would murder their own Brothers for, if they knew they had seen uncoverd’, & what
so studiously they reserve only to their own view. But the whole Sexe is Left to their
home devotions, and conversations one with another; By w[hi]ch inaccessibility, and
impossibility of applications to them; it comes to passe that the <80v> Governm[en]t of
this Empire is wholly Masculine; w[hi]ch it is in no part of Christendome, where though
the women by law are excluded from the entering into Sessions of Parliam[en]ts and
offices of state; yet the charming & irresistible beauty of [th]e Soft Sexe above Law;
gives rules to the very Lawgivers themselves in a great measure; and by their Smiles and
Graces, meet with more reverence and Awe to their commands Then Superiors
themselves receive from their frowns. All w[hi]ch despoticall power of the Sexe is
perfectly abrogated Here, where Women are neither to be seen, not spoken to.
But My Lord Leaving this Digression concerning [th]e Sexe, w[hi]ch I could not omitt
the reppresenting the State of, having occasion to speake something of them as to
Religion: I must needs mention some great advantages Mahumedanisme had in making
Proselytes out of the Christians, w[hi]ch I omitted when I mentioned their First Great
Principle so often repeated by them dayly that there is but one God; For my Lord from
hence they Conclude that nothing else is to receive any Demonstrations of worship; all
deference of devotion belonging onely to that being w[hi]ch knows whither it be renderd’
from the from the Heart or not; & consequently all outward Acts of reverence implying in
the object to w[hi]ch it is payd a καρδιογνῶσις326 or knowing of the thoughts: Hence they
indisputably breake all Images; whose worship being as I sayd before introducd’ by
Constantine, brought irreconcilable differences into the Church and all those Christians
who were Εἰκονομαχίαori327 or for the breaking of Images w[hi]ch some Emperours &
Councills were, if their own Consciences could not permitt them to embrace Turcisme;
yet it made them willing to admitt the yoke; rather then to be forcd’ to an adoration of
καρδιογνῶσις is a compound of καρδία, ‘heart,’ and γνῶσις, ‘seeking to know, inquiry, investigation.’
Here, Finch uses the term to mean ‘knowledge/knowing of the heart,’ in juxtaposition to “knowing of the
thoughts.”
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both terms.
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that whey abhord’. And upon the same Ground the Turkes are against Images & Pictures,
They are against Praying to Saints, that in Hypothesi; supposing the Saints to be,
omniscient & omnipresent. <81r> For if they know not all mens thoughts, possibly they
may not know His that Prayes to them; & what return then ought He to expect of what
did not animadvert His Petition; w[hi]ch makes omnipresence necessary, or else every
Individuall Mans Prayer was not certain to be heard much lesse granted, if the Saint
should be chance to be out of the way; or if the Prayer was made by one out of the sphere
of the Activity or Diocesse of the Saint. And the school distinction th[a]t the Saints See
all these things in God tamquam in speculo, is but an empty sound: For How can a finite
thing as a Glasse is, reppresent an infinite object and such is [th]e Divine knowledge;
And if they will have the Glasse to be God Himselfe and so Infinite, Then The Eye that
beholds it must be infinite too to Survey It, w[hi]ch to the Saints which have but finite
organs and must see part by part is impossible. And the Turkes doe so abhorr this
Doctrine that instead of praying to Mahomet they constantly pray to God, for Him their
Great Prophett; & begg of God to glorify Him every day more & more; This Doctrine of
theirs mett with many Christians who readily submitted to it, by becomming Professors,
or putting themselves under the Protection of those that held a Doctrine so agreeable to
their own sense. But since than Mahomet first broachd’ His Doctrine Transubstantiation
(for then though 600 years after Christ it was not not heard of) upon its Principle it more
vehemently impugnd’ then all Image worship or Paganism; They Pretending that [tha]t
Severall Statues reppresented so many Gods as Roman Catholicks will have them now to
doe Saints; But the Roman Church making the Turkes believe that one part of [th]e
flower out of w[hi]ch they made their bread, is converted into the very essence of God
Himselfe, the Creation into the Creator; doe more provoke their Anathema’s then any
thing they most detest; and invites those Christians that abhor the Doctrine to recurr to
them for Protection against the Persecution <81v> of those, who condemn those th[a]t
will not assent to this Doctrine against their own Consciences; to temporall flames in this
world, and to eternall ones (as farr as their vote goes) in the world to come: And thus the
Turk gaines still upon Hungary; & is still like to doe so, unlesse persecution for Religion
be taken off.
My Lord I have not instanced in any Precepts of Mahometanism w[hi]ch were designd’ to
bring Pagans to submitt to His Governm[en]t Because No Quarter is allowd’ to any th[a]t
either deny there is one God, or assert that there is more than One; And Paganism at the
Time of the Publication of the Alcoran was upon its last Leggs; and as to the number &
Power of the Profession scarce considerable; as the Suddain conquest of Persia showd’.
But I thinke If I flatter not myself that I have somewhat out of [th]e ordinary Road,
showed the Religion of Mahomet to be calculated out of Prudentiall Principles, for
growth & Encrease of its profession, & consequently for Grandeur of Empire; Now this
Religion was like to remain unchangd’ from two Principles. First Because tis not Lawfull
to dispute the points of [th]e Alcoran as to praecepts whether they be lawfull or not; for it
is enjoynd’ by Mahomet as well as it was by Moses That He shall be cutt off that Speakes
against the Law. Secondly the Civill Law of the Government is so twisted with the
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Ecclesiasticall; That the very basis of the Governm[en]t is built upon the reverence to the
Law; in the very Same manner The Precepts of the Alcoran being Jure Divino to the
Turkes as the Judiciall Law of Moses was to the Jewes, upon the Common Principles of
Divine Revelation: And therefore the Gran Signor (who must have obedience from His
Subjects unlesse He or they renounced the fayth upon this Ground) gives Great
Reverence to the Mufti who like the Pope the Scriptures Interprets the Alcoran; and if He
is calld’ before the Mufti as sometimes He is upon some extravagant putting men to
death; or Enormous Vices, The Gran Signor himselfe in honour to [th]e Law sits not
down but stands up and <82r> and this Is done in perfect reverence to [th]e Law & not
[th]e Mufti; in regard He holds not this charge for life like the Pope, but is removeable
whensoever the Gran Signor pleases: Mahomet like a wise Prince being the Lawgiver,
having Learnd’ from the vexations and troubles the Emperours mett with from the
exorbitant assuming of Jurisdiction of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and the Popes in
Rome; to fit the Ecclesiasticall part of the Governm[en]t to a perfect dependence upon the
Secular in the Person of the Prince; who allwayes names, & as often as He pleases
changes the Mufti, and that without the least dispute, that Prerogative being as much Jure
Divino to [th]e Gran Signor, as any that are annexed to the Person or office of [th]e
Mufti; both their rights depending upon the Same noble Law as they call the Alcoran.
My Lord Having I fear tyred your Lo[rdshi]ps patience with the necessity of Greatnesse
That must result to an Empire founded upon the Principles of Mahomet; and in the
Conjunction He found & left things; I dare not enter upon a particular Examination at
present of the Grounds of their Civill and Military Constitutions; But I dare affirm to
your Lo[rdshi]p they are no Lesse conducible to the Greatnesse of Empire then the
Religion is; & I believe would be an Enquiry of much Curiosity to your Lo[rdshi]p.
When I know it a thing desirable; I shall find so much time as to give an account of that,
suitable to those great fundamentals of Reason w[hi]ch I perceive to move this Great
Machine; For beleive it My Lord No Governm[en]t can wax Great & Permanent but it
must be deeply rooted in the Stable Grounds of Reason; and knowing no man a Greater
Judge of them then your Lo[rdshi]p I would most willingly suggest my thoughts to a
Person that knows how to correct & pardon their mistakes; I am sure your Lo[rdshi]p will
make none in esteeming me to be My Lord
Your Lo[rdshi]ps
Most faythfull humble servant &
most entirely affectionate Brother John Finch

Sr Thomas Baines is with unalterable devotion & fidelity yo[u]r Lo[rdshi]ps most reall &
humble Servant.
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